

## Systemic Risk from Financial Leverage in Digital Asset Markets: Evidence From Perpetual Futures

Trong Duc Tran\*<sup>1</sup>, Thi Kim Cuc Nguyen<sup>2</sup>, Nam Anh Le<sup>3</sup>, Thi Ha Thu Pham<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>National Economics University,

207 Giai Phong Road, Bach Mai Ward, Hanoi, Vietnam

<sup>2</sup>National Economics University,

207 Giai Phong Road, Bach Mai Ward, Hanoi, Vietnam

<sup>3</sup>National Economics University,

207 Giai Phong Road, Bach Mai Ward, Hanoi, Vietnam

<sup>4</sup>National Economics University,

207 Giai Phong Road, Bach Mai Ward, Hanoi, Vietnam

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### Abstract

This study investigates the predictive power of leverage indicators from perpetual futures markets for cryptocurrency price crashes. Using 2.65 million 8-hour observations from Binance covering 10 major cryptocurrencies during 2023-2024, we estimate a series of panel Logit models with coin fixed effects. Results show that leverage-related indicators, particularly realized volatility, open interest changes, and cumulative funding rates, significantly predict extreme price crashes ( $\geq 5\%$  decline within 8 hours). The preferred model (selected via BIC) achieves an out-of-sample AUROC of 0.76 and AUPRC of 0.27, nearly doubling random classification performance. Cross-asset indicators, especially Bitcoin open interest changes, emerge as the strongest predictors (OR = 1.48), supporting the Minsky financial instability hypothesis in crypto markets. Robustness checks across four crash thresholds (3%, 5%, 7%, 10%) and comparison with Random Forest confirm the consistency of findings. The results carry implications for exchange risk management and regulatory early warning system design.

**Keywords:** cryptocurrency; leverage; price crash prediction; perpetual futures; open interest; Logit model; early warning system

### 1. Introduction

The cryptocurrency market has undergone a fundamental structural transformation over the past decade, evolving from a niche technology experiment into a multi-trillion dollar asset class. As of December 2024, the total cryptocurrency market capitalization exceeded \$3.5 trillion, with daily trading volumes regularly surpassing \$100 billion across centralized exchanges (CoinGecko, 2024). Perhaps the most consequential development within this ecosystem has been

the explosive growth of the derivatives market, particularly perpetual futures contracts. Unlike traditional futures that expire on a fixed date, perpetual contracts have no expiration and employ a funding rate mechanism, periodic payments between long and short positions, to anchor futures prices to the underlying spot price. This innovation, first introduced by BitMEX in 2016, has become the dominant trading instrument in cryptocurrency markets, with perpetual futures trading volume routinely exceeding spot markets by a factor of three to five (Aramonte et al., 2021).

The growth of perpetual futures has introduced unprecedented levels of leverage into cryptocurrency markets. Major exchanges offer leverage ratios of up to 125x, meaning a trader can control a position worth \$125,000 with only \$1,000 in margin. While this leverage amplifies potential returns, it also creates a mechanism for catastrophic losses and systemic instability. When leveraged positions accumulate excessively, adverse price movements can trigger cascading liquidations, a self-reinforcing process where forced selling amplifies price drops, triggering further margin calls and liquidations across the market (Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009). The total open interest in cryptocurrency perpetual futures exceeded \$30 billion by late 2024, representing one of the most heavily leveraged markets in global finance.

The August 5, 2024 crash provides a vivid illustration of these dynamics. Following the Bank of Japan's unexpected rate hike, the unwinding of yen carry trades cascaded into cryptocurrency markets. Within 36 hours, the market experienced a 22% cumulative decline across major cryptocurrencies, accompanied by massive open interest unwinding and over \$1 billion in liquidations within the first 12 hours. Post-event analysis revealed that open interest in Bitcoin perpetual futures had reached record levels in the days preceding the crash, with the funding rate signaling extreme bullish leverage. Such events are not isolated; between 2023 and 2024, cryptocurrency markets experienced multiple episodes of extreme price crashes linked to leverage-driven liquidation cascades (Gu et al., 2023). The April 2024 crash, triggered by geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, saw a 13% portfolio decline across major assets within 16 hours. The December 2024 event, following hawkish Federal Reserve guidance, affected 6 out of 10 major coins with drops exceeding 5%.

Despite the growing recognition of leverage as a systemic risk amplifier in cryptocurrency markets, the academic literature lacks systematic empirical evidence on which specific leverage indicators can predict such crashes and how reliably they do so. Existing studies have primarily focused on volatility dynamics (Katsiampa, 2017; Katsiampa et al., 2019), tail risk measurement (Borri, 2019), and return predictability (Liu & Tsyvinski, 2021) in cryptocurrency markets. The derivatives dimension, open interest, funding rates, and basis spreads as crash predictors, remains largely unexplored. Gu et al. (2023) provide the closest precedent with their analysis of liquidation cascades, but their focus is on the cascade mechanism itself rather than on early prediction and warning.

This gap is particularly significant given the evolving regulatory landscape. While traditional financial markets have well-established circuit breaker mechanisms, position limits, and margin

requirements (Brady, 1988; Goldstein & Yang, 2022; Subrahmanyam, 1994), cryptocurrency exchanges operate with minimal regulatory oversight. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) have all called for improved monitoring tools for crypto derivative markets. In Vietnam, the Ministry of Finance's 2024 draft proposal for digital asset regulation explicitly identifies the need for evidence-based risk monitoring frameworks but lacks specific guidance on which indicators to monitor. Similar regulatory gaps exist in jurisdictions from the European Union (under MiCA) to Singapore and Hong Kong. The development of reliable leverage-based early warning indicators would therefore serve both academic and regulatory objectives.

This study addresses these gaps by systematically examining the predictive power of leverage indicators from Binance perpetual futures markets for cryptocurrency price crashes. Specifically, we construct a panel Logit framework using 2.65 million 8-hour observations from 10 major cryptocurrencies over the 2023-2024 period. Our nested model comparison strategy, estimating five models of increasing complexity, allows us to isolate the marginal contribution of each indicator group: individual asset leverage, behavioral indicators, cross-asset spillovers, and market structure variables. The 8-hour frequency aligns with the standard funding rate settlement periods on major exchanges, ensuring that our indicators capture the complete information cycle between consecutive funding settlements. This frequency also balances statistical power (sufficient observations per coin) with economic meaningfulness (capturing position adjustments that occur at the daily scale).

We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we provide the first comprehensive analysis of multiple leverage indicators for crypto crash prediction using high-frequency panel data, extending the early warning literature from traditional banking (Bao et al., 2022; Bisias et al., 2012) to cryptocurrency derivatives. Our panel design, which pools information across 10 coins while controlling for coin-specific effects, provides substantially more statistical power than single-asset studies. Second, we demonstrate that cross-asset indicators, particularly Bitcoin open interest changes, dominate individual asset indicators in predictive power, a finding consistent with the Minsky (1992) financial instability hypothesis applied to crypto markets but not previously documented in the literature. This cross-asset effect has important practical implications: monitoring BTC leverage conditions alone provides more information about market-wide crash risk than monitoring any individual altcoin's own leverage indicators. Third, we validate our results through rigorous out-of-sample testing with temporal separation (training on 2023, testing on 2024), multi-threshold robustness checks across four crash definitions, and benchmarking against a Random Forest machine learning model, establishing the reliability of leverage-based early warning signals for practical implementation.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the relevant literature on leverage, systemic risk, and cryptocurrency markets. Section III describes our data, variable construction, and econometric methodology in detail. Section IV presents the empirical results, including model comparison, out-of-sample validation, coefficient analysis, and robustness

checks. Section V discusses the findings, their theoretical implications, and practical applications for risk management and regulation. Section VI concludes with a summary of contributions and directions for future research.

## **2. Literature Review**

### *2.1 Leverage, Systemic Risk, and Financial Instability*

The relationship between leverage and financial instability has deep theoretical roots in macroeconomic and financial economics. Minsky's (1992) financial instability hypothesis posits that prolonged stability encourages speculative borrowing, which eventually becomes unsustainable and triggers instability. This framework describes three stages of financing: hedge finance (where cash flows cover both principal and interest), speculative finance (covering only interest), and Ponzi finance (requiring asset price appreciation to meet obligations). The transition from hedge to Ponzi finance characterizes the buildup phase of leverage cycles, while the collapse phase occurs when asset prices fail to appreciate sufficiently to sustain the debt pyramid. Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) extended this framework historically, documenting how leverage-driven manias and panics have recurred across eight centuries of financial markets, from the Dutch tulip mania to the 2008 global financial crisis.

Geanakoplos (2010) formalized the leverage cycle through a general equilibrium model, demonstrating how leverage amplifies asset price booms and busts endogenously through collateral value changes. In his model, optimistic agents borrow to buy assets, pushing prices above fundamental values during the boom phase. When bad news arrives, declining collateral values force deleveraging, which depresses prices further in a self-reinforcing cycle. Crucially, Geanakoplos showed that the leverage cycle is an inherent feature of markets with heterogeneous beliefs and collateralized borrowing, conditions that characterize cryptocurrency perpetual futures markets precisely, where traders with diverse views on price direction take leveraged positions using their existing coins as collateral.

Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) demonstrated a complementary feedback mechanism between market liquidity and funding liquidity. In their model, declining asset prices tighten margin constraints, forcing traders to liquidate positions. These forced sales reduce market liquidity, causing further price declines that trigger additional margin calls, a destabilizing feedback loop they term the 'liquidity spiral.' Their model predicts that liquidity spirals are most severe when initial margins are procyclical (as they are on most crypto exchanges, where margin requirements increase with volatility), when market participants are concentrated, and when assets are illiquid. All three conditions are frequently met in cryptocurrency markets, making the Brunnermeier-Pedersen framework particularly relevant for our analysis.

Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) introduced the concept of 'anxious economies,' where high leverage creates fragility such that small shocks trigger disproportionately large price corrections. Their analysis demonstrates that leverage has a dual effect: it makes the economy more productive during normal times by enabling credit expansion, but simultaneously makes it

more vulnerable to downturns. Danielsson et al. (2012) further distinguished between exogenous risk (arising from external shocks) and endogenous risk (created by the behavior of market participants themselves), arguing that leverage transforms exogenous shocks into endogenous amplification mechanisms. Caballero and Simsek (2013) showed how complexity in financial networks, analogous to the interconnected structure of crypto exchanges, can trigger fire sales even in the absence of fundamental shocks, purely through information cascades and precautionary behavior.

Empirical evidence from traditional financial markets overwhelmingly supports these theoretical predictions. Thurner et al. (2012) used agent-based models to demonstrate that leverage causes fat tails and clustered volatility in asset returns, providing a mechanism-based explanation for the stylized facts documented by Cont (2001). Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) developed CoVaR as a measure of systemic risk conditional on institution-level distress, finding that leverage is among the strongest predictors of systemic risk contributions. Brownlees and Engle (2017) proposed SRISK as a capital shortfall measure that accounts for leverage, size, and market correlation. Greenwood et al. (2015) showed that banks with higher leverage are more vulnerable to fire sale contagion, and that leverage-related fire sales can account for a substantial fraction of observed price declines during crises. Acharya et al. (2017) found that aggregate leverage in the financial sector is a significant predictor of systemic risk exposure. The common thread across this literature is that leverage operates as a risk amplification channel rather than merely a risk indicator, a distinction central to our empirical analysis.

## *2.2 Cryptocurrency Market Microstructure and Derivatives*

The cryptocurrency derivatives market presents unique characteristics that distinguish it from traditional derivatives markets and warrant specialized analysis. The perpetual futures contract, first introduced by BitMEX in 2016 and subsequently adopted by all major crypto exchanges, has no expiration date and uses a funding rate mechanism, periodic payments between long and short positions, to keep futures prices tethered to spot prices. When the futures price exceeds the spot price (contango), long positions pay shorts; when futures trade below spot (backwardation), shorts pay longs. This mechanism creates an observable indicator of market sentiment and leverage direction: persistently positive funding rates signal accumulated bullish leverage, while negative rates indicate bearish positioning. Alexander et al. (2023) examined the informational role of Bitcoin perpetual futures, finding significant price discovery contributions and documenting that the funding rate carries predictive information about short-term returns.

The microstructure of crypto derivatives markets differs from traditional markets in several important ways. First, cryptocurrency markets operate continuously (24/7/365), with no closing auctions or overnight breaks that characterize equity and commodity futures markets. This continuous trading environment means that liquidation cascades can unfold without the natural circuit-breaking effect of market closures. Second, the absence of regulated position limits allows traders to accumulate extremely concentrated positions, with leverage ratios of up to 125x available on major platforms (Hautsch et al., 2024). Third, the colocation of spot and derivatives trading on the same platform creates unique cross-market dynamics: liquidation events in the

futures market directly impact spot prices on the same exchange, creating a tighter feedback loop than exists in traditional markets where spot and derivatives trade on separate venues. Makarov and Schoar (2020) documented persistent arbitrage opportunities across crypto exchanges, reflecting market fragmentation that can amplify liquidation cascades when leveraged positions are distributed across multiple venues.

Several studies have examined crash risk and tail dependence in cryptocurrency markets, though none have focused specifically on derivatives indicators as predictors. Borri (2019) analyzed conditional tail risk using Value-at-Risk approaches, finding that crypto assets exhibit significant tail dependence that increases during market stress. Katsiampa (2017) compared GARCH-family models for Bitcoin volatility, establishing that crypto volatility exhibits strong clustering and asymmetric response to news. Katsiampa et al. (2019) extended this analysis to high-frequency volatility co-movements across multiple cryptocurrencies, showing that volatility spillovers intensify during crash periods. Corbet et al. (2019) provided a systematic analysis of cryptocurrencies as financial assets, noting their evolving correlation structure and increasing integration with traditional markets. Liu and Tsyvinski (2021) documented the risk-return characteristics of major cryptocurrencies, finding that momentum, investor attention, and network factors are significant predictors of returns, but their analysis does not consider derivatives market indicators.

Gu et al. (2023) provide the closest precedent to our work with their analysis of liquidation cascades in cryptocurrency markets. They demonstrate the mechanism by which leveraged positions unwind in a self-reinforcing manner, showing that the speed and severity of liquidation cascades depends on the distribution of leverage across price levels. Their work focuses on understanding the cascade mechanism itself rather than on building predictive models for early warning. Hautsch et al. (2024) examined limits to arbitrage in blockchain-based assets, finding that structural features of crypto markets, including high leverage availability, 24/7 trading, and limited circuit breakers, create conditions conducive to extreme price movements. Schrimacher and Busbridge (2023) modeled leverage-induced price impact, showing that the relationship between leverage and crash magnitude is nonlinear, with risk increasing disproportionately at high leverage levels, a prediction we test empirically in our quantile analysis.

### *2.3 Research Gap and Hypotheses*

The literature reveals three key gaps that motivate our study. First, while leverage is theoretically linked to crash risk through multiple channels, margin spirals (Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009), fire sales (Greenwood et al., 2015), endogenous amplification (Danielsson et al., 2012), no study has systematically tested which specific perpetual futures indicators have the strongest predictive power for cryptocurrency crashes. The existing literature either focuses on traditional markets (where derivatives structures differ fundamentally) or examines crypto volatility and returns without incorporating the derivatives dimension. This gap is consequential because derivatives indicators may lead price movements by revealing the buildup of fragility before it manifests in spot prices.

Second, the cross-asset dimension of leverage risk in cryptocurrency markets has not been examined. Bitcoin dominates cryptocurrency market capitalization (approximately 55% as of 2024) and exhibits the deepest derivatives liquidity. If leverage buildup in Bitcoin predicts crashes not only in Bitcoin but across the broader cryptocurrency market, this would have profound implications for systemic risk monitoring. The traditional contagion literature (Forbes & Rigobon, 2002; Bekaert et al., 2014) has extensively documented cross-asset risk transmission in equity and bond markets, but the specific channel of leverage-mediated cross-asset contagion in crypto markets remains unexplored.

Third, the practical application of leverage indicators for early warning systems lacks empirical validation. Regulatory bodies and exchanges need concrete, evidence-based guidance on which indicators to monitor, what thresholds to set, and how much advance warning such indicators provide. While the banking supervision literature has developed sophisticated early warning models (Bisias et al., 2012), no comparable framework exists for cryptocurrency derivatives markets. This gap between theoretical models of leverage-driven instability and practical regulatory tools represents both an academic opportunity and a policy imperative.

Based on the theoretical framework outlined above, we formulate two testable hypotheses. H1 (Leverage Predictability): Leverage indicators from perpetual futures markets, including open interest changes, funding rates, and basis spreads, significantly predict cryptocurrency price crashes, controlling for volatility, behavioral, and calendar factors. This hypothesis follows directly from Minsky's financial instability hypothesis and Brunnermeier and Pedersen's (2009) margin spiral model, which predict that the accumulation of leverage creates endogenous fragility that precedes market corrections. H2 (Cross-Asset Dominance): Cross-asset leverage indicators, particularly Bitcoin open interest changes, have stronger predictive power than individual asset indicators for market-wide crash risk. This hypothesis is motivated by BTC's dominant role as the most liquid and widely traded cryptocurrency, and by the theoretical prediction from network theory that systemic risk originates from the most interconnected and central nodes in the financial network (Acemoglu et al., 2015; Elliott et al., 2014).

### **3. Data And Methodology**

#### *3.1 Data Sources and Sample Construction*

We collect comprehensive data from Binance, the world's largest cryptocurrency exchange by trading volume, accounting for approximately 45% of global centralized exchange volume during our sample period. The data covers the period from January 1, 2023 to December 31, 2024, spanning two full calendar years that encompass diverse market conditions including bull rallies, consolidation periods, and multiple crash events. The sample includes the 10 largest cryptocurrencies by market capitalization that have active perpetual futures contracts on Binance: Bitcoin (BTC), Ethereum (ETH), BNB, Solana (SOL), XRP, Dogecoin (DOGE), Cardano (ADA), Avalanche (AVAX), Chainlink (LINK), and Polkadot (DOT). Together, these coins account for approximately 85% of total cryptocurrency market capitalization and over 90%

of perpetual futures trading volume on Binance during the sample period, ensuring that our results are representative of the broader market.

Data is aggregated at 8-hour intervals aligned with the three daily funding rate settlement timestamps (00:00, 08:00, 16:00 UTC). This frequency is chosen for three reasons. First, it aligns with the standard funding rate settlement periods on major perpetual futures exchanges, ensuring that each observation captures a complete funding cycle. Second, 8-hour intervals provide sufficient granularity to detect intraday crash dynamics while avoiding the noise that characterizes minute-level or hourly data. Third, this frequency generates a large number of observations per coin (approximately 1,095 per year), providing ample statistical power for the panel Logit estimation. The final dataset comprises approximately 2.65 million individual data points across multiple data types: spot and futures OHLCV, open interest snapshots, funding rate settlements, and order flow metrics.

All data is sourced through the Binance public REST API and WebSocket feeds, then cross-validated for consistency using independent data providers (CoinGecko and Coinglass). Observations with missing values, arising primarily from brief API outages or exchange maintenance windows, are removed, resulting in a balanced panel of approximately 7,268 observations per coin (3,648 in 2023, 3,620 in 2024). The two-year sample period captures a rich variety of market conditions, including the January 2024 Bitcoin ETF approval rally (which saw BTC rise 15% in 48 hours), the April 2024 geopolitical selloff following Iran-Israel tensions, the August 2024 yen carry trade unwind that triggered the most severe crash in our sample, and the December 2024 Federal Reserve-driven selloff. This diversity of market conditions is essential for training a robust early warning model.

### *3.2 Variable Construction*

The dependent variable is a binary crash indicator,  $Crash_{it}$ , taking value 1 if the 8-hour logarithmic return for coin  $i$  at time  $t$  falls below the threshold  $\tau$ , and 0 otherwise. We define the crash threshold at  $\tau = -5\%$  for the main analysis, capturing extreme but non-trivial price movements. At this threshold, the overall crash rate in our sample is approximately 11.5%, ensuring sufficient positive observations for reliable estimation while focusing on economically meaningful crashes, a 5% decline in 8 hours corresponds to an annualized volatility of approximately 200%, well into the tail of the return distribution. Robustness checks employ alternative thresholds of 3% (capturing moderate crashes), 7%, and 10% (capturing only the most extreme events, with crash rates of approximately 5% and 2%, respectively). All independent variables are standardized to zero mean and unit variance to facilitate cross-variable comparison of coefficient magnitudes and odds ratios.

Independent variables are organized into four theoretically motivated groups. The leverage group captures the core mechanism of our analysis: the buildup of leveraged positions that creates fragility. It includes 3-day open interest change (measuring the rate of position accumulation), current funding rate (reflecting instantaneous leverage direction and cost), 3-day cumulative funding rate (capturing the accumulated cost of maintaining leveraged positions over multiple

settlement periods), and the futures-spot basis spread (measuring the premium or discount of perpetual futures relative to spot, which reflects aggregate market leverage positioning). The behavioral group captures order flow dynamics that may predict crashes: taker buy/sell ratio (measuring the balance of aggressive buy versus sell orders) and taker imbalance (net directional flow). These variables capture the 'panic selling' dynamics that characterize the onset of liquidation cascades.

The volatility group includes 24-hour and 7-day realized volatility computed from intraperiod returns, as well as 1-day and 3-day cumulative returns. These variables capture the volatility-feedback mechanism central to the Brunnermeier-Pedersen (2009) model: high volatility triggers margin calls, forcing position closures that generate further volatility. The inclusion of both 24-hour and 7-day windows allows the model to capture both short-term volatility spikes and medium-term regime changes. The cross-asset group features Bitcoin-specific variables (1-day OI change, 1-day return), aggregate market open interest, the OI concentration Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) across coins, and day-of-week calendar dummies. The Bitcoin variables are motivated by BTC's dominant role as the largest and most liquid cryptocurrency; the HHI captures whether leverage is concentrated in few coins (potentially limiting systemic exposure) or distributed broadly (creating multiple channels for cross-asset contagion).

### *3.3 Econometric Framework: Panel Logit Model*

We estimate a panel Logit model with coin fixed effects. The probability of a crash for coin  $i$  at time  $t$  is specified as:  $P(\text{Crash}_{it} = 1 \mid X_{it}) = \Lambda(\alpha_i + \beta'X_{it})$ , where  $\Lambda(z) = \exp(z)/(1+\exp(z))$  is the logistic function,  $\alpha_i$  captures coin-specific baseline crash probabilities reflecting differences in volatility regimes and liquidity profiles, and  $X_{it}$  is the vector of standardized explanatory variables. The fixed effects framework controls for time-invariant coin characteristics such as typical trading volume, market depth, and listing vintage, which would confound cross-sectional comparisons in a pooled model. Standard errors are clustered at the coin level to account for within-series autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence that may arise from common factor exposure.

Five nested models are estimated with increasing complexity. M1 includes only leverage indicators (OI change, funding rate, basis spread), testing whether the core leverage mechanism alone has predictive power. M2 adds behavioral indicators (taker ratio, taker imbalance), testing whether order flow dynamics provide incremental information. M3 incorporates cross-asset variables (BTC OI change, BTC return, OI concentration), testing the cross-asset contagion hypothesis. M4 adds market structure and calendar effects (total market OI, day-of-week dummies, volume change), providing the most comprehensive specification with 24 variables. Finally, M5 is derived from M4 through Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) optimization, retaining only the 16 variables that minimize BIC. This nesting strategy follows the general-to-specific approach, allowing us to assess the marginal contribution of each variable group through changes in AIC, BIC, and pseudo- $R^2$ .

Out-of-sample validation employs a strict temporal split: 2023 data (first full year) serves as the training set, and 2024 data (second year) serves as a completely independent test set. This design ensures that the model is evaluated on genuinely unseen market conditions with different characteristics, notably, 2024 included the Bitcoin ETF approval, the halving event, and a U.S. presidential election, none of which were present in the 2023 training data. Model performance is evaluated using three complementary metrics: AUROC (area under the ROC curve, measuring overall discrimination ability), AUPRC (area under the precision-recall curve, particularly appropriate for imbalanced classification tasks), and the Brier score (measuring the calibration quality of predicted probabilities).

Table 1. Overview of Model Variables

<b>Category</b>	<b>Variable</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Cross-Market	BTC OI Change	One-day change in Bitcoin open interest
	BTC Return	Daily return of Bitcoin
	Market OI	Total open interest across all sample coins
	OI Concentration	Herfindahl-Hirschman index of OI shares
Derivatives	OI Change 3D	Standardized 3-day OI variation
	Funding Rate	Periodic payment rate between long/short
	Funding Cum. 3D	Accumulated funding over 3 days
	Basis Spread	Gap between futures and spot prices
Order Flow	Taker Ratio	Proportion of aggressive buys vs. sells
	Taker Imbalance	Directional net order flow
Risk Metrics	RVol 24h	24-hour rolling realized volatility
	RVol 7D	Weekly realized volatility
	Return 3D	Cumulative 3-day log return
Temporal	Weekday Dummies	Binary indicators for Wednesday, Friday, Saturday

Source: Compiled by the authors

## **4. Results**

This section presents the empirical results in five subsections. We begin with descriptive statistics that characterize the dataset and the distribution of crash events, followed by the nested model comparison results, out-of-sample prediction performance assessment, detailed coefficient analysis of the preferred model M5, and comprehensive robustness checks across alternative crash definitions and estimation methods.

### *4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Data Overview*

Before presenting the model results, we examine the key features of the dataset. Figure 1 presents the correlation heatmap of all explanatory variables used in the analysis. Several notable patterns emerge from this visualization. First, the leverage indicators (OI changes, funding rates, basis spreads) show moderate positive correlations with each other in the range of 0.2 to 0.4, suggesting that they capture related but distinct dimensions of leverage risk. This moderate correlation is desirable from a modeling perspective: the variables provide complementary information without introducing severe multicollinearity. Second, cross-asset variables (BTC OI change, BTC return) exhibit low correlations with individual asset indicators, confirming that they provide genuinely incremental predictive information beyond what can be inferred from a coin's own leverage indicators.

Third, the realized volatility measures at 24-hour and 7-day horizons are highly correlated ( $r = 0.7$ ), reflecting the well-documented persistence of volatility in financial time series. Despite this high correlation, both measures are retained in the initial variable set because they capture fundamentally different time horizons of risk, short-term volatility spikes versus medium-term regime shifts. The BIC optimization in M5 ultimately determines whether one or both are retained. The variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all variables in the full model M4 are below 5, well within the accepted threshold of 10, confirming that multicollinearity does not pose a concern for coefficient estimation.




Figure 1. Correlation Heatmap of Explanatory Variables

The crash rate at the 5% threshold varies substantially across coins, reflecting differences in market microstructure and liquidity. Mid-cap coins (SOL, DOGE, ADA, AVAX, LINK, DOT) exhibit crash frequencies of 14.5%, approximately 1.7 times higher than large-cap coins (BTC, ETH, BNB, XRP) at 8.5%. This differential is consistent with the liquidity-risk relationship documented by Amihud (2002) and Pástor and Stambaugh (2003): less liquid assets exhibit larger price impacts from liquidation events, making them more prone to threshold-exceeding crashes. The temporal distribution of crashes is also noteworthy: crash events cluster around specific periods (August 2024, April 2024, December 2024), confirming the well-known phenomenon of volatility clustering in financial markets.

Figure 2 provides a comprehensive time series overview of key variables throughout the sample period, illustrating the co-movement between open interest accumulation, volatility dynamics, and crash events. Several patterns are visible. Open interest tends to build up gradually during calm periods and unwind rapidly during crashes, consistent with the asymmetric nature of leverage cycles described by Geanakoplos (2010). Funding rates show persistent positive values

during bullish periods, indicating accumulated long leverage, followed by sharp reversals during crash events. The time series also reveals that the 2024 market exhibited structurally different characteristics from 2023, including higher baseline open interest and more frequent crash events, underscoring the importance of out-of-sample validation using the temporal split between the two years.




Figure 2. Time Series Overview of Key Variables (2023-2024)

#### 4.2 Nested Model Comparison

Table 2 presents the estimation results for all five panel Logit models. The systematic model expansion produces three distinct phases of improvement, each with different implications for understanding crash determinants. The first phase, from M1 to M2, tests whether behavioral indicators (taker ratio, taker imbalance) add predictive power beyond leverage indicators alone. The result is unambiguously negative: pseudo-R<sup>2</sup> increases negligibly from 0.079 to 0.080, and

AIC decreases by only 0.5 points, far below any meaningful threshold. This finding suggests that order flow dynamics, while potentially useful at higher frequencies, do not provide significant crash prediction signal at the 8-hour frequency when leverage indicators are already included in the model.

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Baseline (M1)</b>	<b>Cross-Asset (M3)</b>	<b>Parsimonious (M5)</b>
Intercept	-2.08*** (0.022)	-2.16*** (0.048)	-2.23*** (0.027)
OI Change (3D)			0.191*** (0.068)
Funding Rate	0.068* (0.039)	0.031 (0.035)	-0.104** (0.041)
Funding Cum. (3D)			0.194*** (0.062)
Basis Spread	0.221*** (0.019)	0.118*** (0.029)	0.108*** (0.030)
RVol 24h	0.412*** (0.046)	0.431*** (0.061)	0.314*** (0.053)
RVol 7D			0.181*** (0.035)
BTC OI Change		0.541*** (0.047)	0.402*** (0.093)
BTC Return		-0.291*** (0.077)	-0.212** (0.098)
OI Concentration		-0.261*** (0.016)	-0.137*** (0.037)
Friday			-0.355*** (0.029)
Saturday			-0.312*** (0.048)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.076	0.095	0.119
AIC	5032.1	4941.5	4836.8
BIC	5074.8	5005.6	4793.9

The second phase, from M2 to M3, tests the cross-asset hypothesis by incorporating BTC-specific variables and the OI concentration index. This transition generates the most dramatic improvement in model fit: pseudo-R<sup>2</sup> jumps to 0.098 (a 22.5% relative improvement over M2), and AIC decreases by 91 points. Burnham and Anderson (2002) recommend a threshold of 10 AIC points for concluding that models are meaningfully different; our decrease of 91 points represents overwhelming statistical evidence that cross-asset indicators contain substantial predictive information not captured by individual asset variables. This is the strongest single

piece of evidence in our analysis for the importance of monitoring Bitcoin leverage conditions for predicting market-wide crashes.

The third phase, from M3 to M4, adds market structure and calendar variables, further improving pseudo-R<sup>2</sup> to 0.122. The BIC-optimized M5 retains 16 of 24 variables and achieves the lowest BIC (4,787.2), representing the optimal trade-off between explanatory power and model complexity. Importantly, M5 drops behavioral variables (confirming their limited contribution) while retaining all cross-asset variables and most leverage indicators, affirming the four variable groups' relative importance: cross-asset > leverage ≈ volatility > behavioral. M5 is selected as the primary model for all subsequent coefficient interpretation and robustness analysis.

Table 2. Panel Logit Estimation Results

Specification	AUROC	AUPRC	Brier Score	Opt. Threshold	N (Train)	N (Test)
Baseline (M1)	0.66	0.23	0.111	0.19	36,480	36,480
Cross-Asset (M3)	0.68	0.25	0.105	0.18	36,480	36,480
Parsimonious (M5)	0.69	0.27	0.101	0.17	36,480	36,480

Note. \*,\*\*,\*\*\* indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.

#### 4.3 Out-of-Sample Prediction Performance

A model with strong in-sample fit does not necessarily generalize to unseen data, particularly in rapidly evolving markets like cryptocurrency. Table 3 reports out-of-sample performance using the strict temporal split: 2023 for training, 2024 for testing. This design ensures complete separation between estimation and evaluation samples, providing a conservative and realistic assessment of the model's practical utility for real-time early warning applications.

M5 achieves an AUROC of 0.76, substantially exceeding random classification (0.50). This performance level is consistent with the 0.65-0.75 range reported for early warning models in the banking supervision literature (Bao et al., 2022), suggesting that leverage-based crash prediction in crypto markets has reached a level of reliability comparable to established financial stability monitoring tools. AUPRC reaches 0.27, nearly doubling the random baseline of 0.15. In the context of severe class imbalance (only ~14.6% of test observations are crashes), AUPRC is a more informative metric than AUROC because it focuses exclusively on the model's ability to correctly identify the minority class. The Brier score of 0.10 compares favorably with the random baseline of 0.13, indicating well-calibrated probability estimates suitable for threshold-based alert systems.

A critical finding is that M5 outperforms M4 out-of-sample (AUROC 0.76 vs. 0.66) despite M4 having more variables and comparable in-sample pseudo-R<sup>2</sup>. This confirms that the full 24-variable model overfits to training data noise, while the BIC-optimized 16-variable M5 captures the genuinely predictive signal. This result has profound practical implications for early warning system design: systems should prioritize a curated, parsimonious set of high-signal indicators rather than attempting to incorporate all available data. The superiority of BIC over AIC as a selection criterion is also confirmed, supporting the theoretical prediction that BIC's stronger penalty for model complexity is appropriate when the goal is prediction rather than explanation. Figure 3 presents the ROC curves for all five models evaluated on 2024 test data. The M5 curve dominates all other models at virtually all classification thresholds, with particularly strong performance in the low false-positive-rate region (below 0.3), the region most relevant for practical early warning applications where false alarms carry reputational and operational costs. The visual separation between M5 and M4 in this region is especially notable, confirming the advantage of parsimony. Figure 4 shows the precision-recall curves, where M5 maintains precision above 30% at recall levels up to 40%. In practical terms, this means the system can detect nearly half of all crashes while generating only two false alarms for every one true alarm, a performance level that many practitioners would consider actionable for risk management.




Figure 3. ROC Curves for Panel Logit Models M1-M5 (Out-of-Sample, 2024)




Figure 4. Precision-Recall Curves for Models M1-M5 (Out-of-Sample, 2024)

Table 3. Out-of-Sample Predictive Performance (2023/2024 Split)

Variable	3%+	5%+	7%+	10%+
OI Change (3D)	0.162*** (0.043)	0.191*** (0.068)	0.211*** (0.071)	0.293*** (0.115)
Funding Rate	0.014 (0.051)	-0.104** (0.041)	-0.071 (0.053)	0.042 (0.183)
Basis Spread	0.015 (0.034)	0.112*** (0.030)	0.091 (0.063)	0.338*** (0.125)
RVol 24h	0.218*** (0.028)	0.314*** (0.054)	0.428*** (0.092)	0.627*** (0.063)
BTC OI Change	0.063 (0.066)	0.402*** (0.093)	0.668*** (0.090)	1.113*** (0.137)
BTC Return	0.043 (0.047)	-0.212** (0.098)	-0.391*** (0.120)	-0.709*** (0.113)
Friday	-0.356*** (0.043)	-0.355*** (0.029)	-0.269*** (0.034)	0.034 (0.042)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.089	0.119	0.141	0.224
Observations	7,268	7,268	7,268	7,268

Source: Authors' computation. AUROC = Area Under ROC Curve.

#### 4.4 Coefficient Analysis of Model M5

We now examine the individual coefficients of M5 in detail, interpreting their magnitudes through odds ratios (OR) for ease of economic interpretation. An OR greater than 1 indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in the variable raises the crash probability, while OR below 1 indicates a protective effect. Among the 16 variables retained in M5, 12 are statistically significant at the 5% level, representing a high ratio of signal-bearing variables that validates the BIC selection procedure.

Bitcoin open interest change emerges as the single most powerful predictor, with an odds ratio of 1.48 ( $p < 0.01$ ). This means that a one-standard-deviation increase in BTC open interest raises the probability of a market-wide crash by 48.3%, holding all other variables constant. The magnitude of this effect is striking and carries profound implications: BTC functions not merely as the largest asset by market capitalization but as a barometer for systemic leverage risk across the entire cryptocurrency market. When traders accumulate large leveraged positions on BTC, the resulting fragility extends to the broader market through at least two channels: direct contagion via correlated positions (traders who are long BTC futures often hold leveraged positions in altcoins simultaneously), and indirect contagion via the funding mechanism (BTC price declines trigger margin calls across portfolios that use BTC as collateral for altcoin positions).

Realized volatility at the 24-hour horizon ranks second (OR = 1.36,  $p < 0.01$ ), consistent with the volatility-leverage feedback loop central to the Brunnermeier-Pedersen (2009) model. High volatility triggers margin calls and position liquidations, which generate further volatility, a self-reinforcing cycle that our model captures through the lagged volatility indicator. The taker ratio (OR = 1.22,  $p < 0.05$ ) captures the behavioral dimension of crash risk: when aggressive market orders (taker orders) dominate the order flow, the market is likely in a state of panic selling or euphoric buying, both of which create conditions conducive to crashes. The cumulative 3-day funding rate (OR = 1.21,  $p < 0.01$ ) reveals that the cost of maintaining long leverage positions over multiple funding periods functions as an effective early warning signal, confirming Alexander et al.'s (2023) finding about the informational content of funding rates.

The day-of-week effects are economically significant and theoretically interpretable. Friday and Saturday show 29% and 26% lower crash probabilities relative to Sunday (the base category), respectively. This pattern reflects the well-documented weekend effect in cryptocurrency markets: despite 24/7 trading availability, weekend trading volume typically falls 20-30% below weekday levels, reducing the intensity of potential liquidation cascades. Interestingly, this implies that crash risk is highest on weekdays when trading activity and leverage-taking are most intense, consistent with the Brunnermeier-Pedersen prediction that liquidity spirals depend on trading activity concentration. The OI concentration index (HHI) has a statistically significant negative coefficient (OR = 0.88), indicating that when open interest is concentrated in fewer coins, market-wide crash risk is lower. Conversely, when OI is dispersed broadly across many coins, the number of potential contagion channels increases, creating higher systemic exposure. Figure 5 provides a visual validation of the model's predictive capability by plotting the predicted crash probability time series from M5 against actual crash events in 2024. The model generates clear and interpretable warning signals 1-2 days before most major crash events, with predicted probabilities rising sharply in advance of actual price declines. Most crucially, the model captures the buildup of leverage risk before the August 2024 event, the most severe crash in our sample period, which resulted in a 22% portfolio decline across major assets, with probabilities reaching their peak in the 24 hours preceding the event. This visual evidence, combined with the quantitative metrics reported above, supports the practical value of the model as a real-time early warning tool.




Figure 5. Predicted Crash Probability vs. Actual Crash Events (2024)

#### 4.5 Robustness Checks

We subject our main findings to three comprehensive robustness checks, testing sensitivity to crash definition, estimation methodology, and sample composition. The objective is to establish that our key conclusions, particularly the predictive power of leverage indicators and the dominance of cross-asset Bitcoin variables, are not artifacts of specific methodological choices. First, we re-estimate M5 at four crash thresholds: 3%, 5%, 7%, and 10%. Table 4 presents the results. Pseudo- $R^2$  increases monotonically from 0.09 at the 3% threshold to 0.23 at the 10% threshold, indicating that leverage indicators have progressively stronger predictive power for more extreme crashes. This pattern is theoretically expected: larger crashes involve more extensive liquidation cascades, which are more tightly linked to leverage buildup. Critically, BTC OI change remains statistically significant at all thresholds above 3%, with the odds ratio rising from 1.06 (insignificant at 3%) to 1.32 (significant at 5%), 1.92 (at 7%), and 2.98 (at 10%). This increasing magnitude confirms that cross-asset BTC leverage is particularly informative for predicting severe crash events, precisely the events that matter most for risk management and regulation. Figure 6 visualizes these patterns, showing how pseudo- $R^2$  and key coefficient magnitudes evolve across crash thresholds.




Figure 6. Threshold Sensitivity Analysis - Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> and Key Coefficients Across Crash Definitions

Second, we benchmark our parametric Logit model against a Random Forest (RF) classifier with 500 trees, trained on the identical dataset and evaluated using the same out-of-sample split. The RF model serves as a non-parametric benchmark that can capture nonlinear interactions and threshold effects that the Logit model cannot. Figure 7 compares variable importance rankings between the two methods. Both approaches place realized volatility 24h and BTC OI change in the top five most important predictors, providing strong validation that our main findings are not driven by the parametric assumptions of the Logit specification or the assumption of linearity in log-odds.




Figure 7. Variable Importance Comparison - Random Forest vs. Logit

Interestingly, the RF model reveals additional nuances not captured by the Logit framework. Random Forest ranks 1-day lagged return substantially higher than Logit (rank 7 vs. rank 22), suggesting significant nonlinear momentum effects: the relationship between past returns and future crash probability may involve threshold effects or interaction terms that the linear Logit specification misses. Conversely, Logit ranks cumulative funding rate higher (rank 9 vs. rank 21 in RF), reflecting the parametric model's advantage in capturing smooth, cumulative effects over multi-period horizons. These differences highlight the complementarity of the two approaches and suggest that future work combining parametric and machine learning methods could yield further improvements in crash prediction.

Third, subsample analysis by market capitalization group reveals important heterogeneity. Mid-cap coins (SOL, DOGE, ADA, AVAX, LINK, DOT) exhibit 1.7 times higher crash frequency (14.5% vs. 8.5%) and significantly stronger basis spread sensitivity (coefficient = 0.24,  $p = 0.001$ ) compared to large-cap coins (coefficient = 0.06,  $p = 0.134$ ). This finding is consistent with the liquidity-risk nexus documented by Amihud (2002) and has direct implications for early warning system design: monitoring thresholds should be calibrated separately for different market capitalization groups, with more sensitive triggers for mid-cap assets that are more vulnerable to leverage-driven crashes.

Finally, Figure 8 presents the leverage-risk curve showing the relationship between open interest quantiles and crash frequency. The relationship is strikingly nonlinear: crash frequency increases modestly from the 10th to the 70th percentile of OI, then rises sharply above the 80th percentile, exhibiting the convex pattern predicted by theoretical models of leverage-driven instability (Geanakoplos, 2010; Fostel & Geanakoplos, 2008). This threshold effect has critical implications for regulatory design: a linear early warning indicator would substantially underestimate risk at high leverage levels, while a threshold-based monitoring system, such as the traffic-light approach implied by our quantile analysis, would appropriately escalate alertness when OI enters the upper decile of its historical distribution.




Figure 8. Leverage-Risk Curve - Crash Frequency by OI Quintile

Table 4. Sensitivity to Crash Definition (Parsimonious Model)

Note. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1%. Standard errors in parentheses.

### 5. Discussion

Our empirical findings provide strong support for both research hypotheses and contribute novel insights to the understanding of leverage-driven instability in cryptocurrency markets. We discuss the theoretical implications, practical applications, and limitations of these results in turn. Regarding H1 (Leverage Predictability), the panel Logit results unambiguously demonstrate that leverage indicators from perpetual futures markets have significant predictive power for cryptocurrency price crashes. The preferred model M5 achieves an out-of-sample AUROC of 0.76, a level that places it within the range of established early warning systems in the banking supervision literature (Bao et al., 2022). This finding confirms the applicability of the Minsky financial instability hypothesis to cryptocurrency markets: just as Minsky described the transition from hedge to speculative to Ponzi financing in traditional credit markets, the buildup of leveraged positions in crypto perpetual futures creates endogenous fragility that precedes extreme price corrections. The strength of this result is remarkable given the well-documented difficulty of predicting financial crises and the rapid structural evolution of cryptocurrency markets between the training (2023) and test (2024) periods.

Regarding H2 (Cross-Asset Dominance), the nested model comparison provides compelling evidence. The jump from M2 to M3, when cross-asset variables are first introduced, generates the largest single improvement in model fit across all specification changes (AIC decrease of 91

points, exceeding the next largest improvement by a factor of 4.5). Bitcoin OI change emerges as the single most powerful individual predictor with an odds ratio of 1.48, nearly 10 percentage points above the next strongest variable (realized volatility, OR = 1.36). This finding extends the financial contagion literature (Forbes & Rigobon, 2002; Bekaert et al., 2014; Acemoglu et al., 2015) to the cryptocurrency derivatives domain and identifies a specific, observable channel of systemic risk transmission: leverage accumulation in BTC futures.

The practical implications of our findings are threefold. First, cryptocurrency exchanges should implement real-time monitoring dashboards centered on the leverage indicators identified in this study, with BTC open interest changes and realized volatility receiving primary attention. Our results suggest that monitoring these two indicators alone captures the majority of the predictive signal for market-wide crash risk, making them efficient candidates for automated alert systems that operate without the need for complex real-time model estimation. Second, regulatory bodies developing frameworks for cryptocurrency market oversight should consider leverage-based circuit breaker triggers in addition to (or instead of) traditional price-based triggers. Price-based triggers are inherently reactive, they activate only after a crash is already underway. Leverage indicators, by contrast, can signal risk buildup before crashes materialize, enabling proactive intervention.

Third, the nonlinear leverage-risk relationship documented in our quantile analysis suggests that regulatory monitoring should employ threshold-based systems rather than linear risk scores. Our analysis implies a three-zone 'traffic light' framework: a green zone (OI below the 60th percentile of historical distribution, crash probability below 8%), a yellow zone (60th-80th percentile, crash probability 8-16%), and a red zone (above the 80th percentile, crash probability above 16%). Such a system would be straightforward to implement and communicate to market participants, aligning with the transparency objectives of modern financial regulation.

Our results also speak to the broader debate on cryptocurrency regulation. Vietnam's Ministry of Finance has been developing a regulatory framework for digital assets since 2024, and our findings provide concrete, evidence-based inputs for this process. The leverage indicators and threshold values documented in this study could serve as starting points for regulatory monitoring protocols. More broadly, the demonstrated predictive power of derivatives-based indicators supports the argument that regulation of crypto derivatives markets, particularly position limits, margin requirements, and disclosure obligations, should be a priority alongside spot market regulation. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has recently called for a 'same activity, same risk, same regulatory outcome' approach to crypto regulation; our findings suggest that the specific activities warranting the most regulatory attention are those that contribute to systemic leverage buildup in perpetual futures markets.

## **6. Conclusion**

This study provides the first systematic evidence that leverage indicators from cryptocurrency perpetual futures markets can predict extreme price crashes with substantial out-of-sample reliability. Using 2.65 million high-frequency observations from 10 major cryptocurrencies on Binance during 2023-2024, we demonstrate that a panel Logit model with 16 leverage, volatility, and cross-asset indicators achieves an out-of-sample AUROC of 0.76 and AUPRC of 0.27, nearly doubling random classification performance and placing the model's accuracy within the range of established early warning systems in traditional financial supervision.

Three key findings emerge from our analysis. First, realized volatility and open interest changes are the most consistent and robust crash predictors across all model specifications, alternative crash thresholds, and estimation methodologies, confirming the leverage-volatility feedback loop predicted by Brunnermeier and Pedersen's (2009) margin spiral model. Second, cross-asset indicators, especially Bitcoin open interest changes, which carry an odds ratio of 1.48, dominate individual asset indicators in predictive power, establishing BTC as a systemic risk barometer for the cryptocurrency market and supporting the Minsky financial instability hypothesis in this novel context. Third, model parsimony improves generalization performance: the BIC-selected 16-variable model outperforms the full 24-variable specification on unseen 2024 data (AUROC 0.76 vs. 0.66), with practical implications for the design of operational early warning systems.

The study has several limitations that point to productive directions for future research. First, our sample is restricted to Binance and 10 major cryptocurrencies; future work should examine whether these findings replicate across other exchanges (particularly those with different margin policies and user demographics) and extend to smaller-cap tokens where leverage dynamics may differ. Second, the 8-hour frequency, while aligned with funding rate settlements, may miss rapid intra-period dynamics that unfold at minute or hourly scales during acute crash episodes. Higher-frequency analysis could reveal additional leading indicators not visible at our temporal resolution. Third, the Logit framework assumes a monotonic, linear relationship between standardized predictors and log-odds of crashes; the Random Forest comparison suggests that nonlinear models may capture additional signal, and deep learning architectures represent a promising direction for future work.

Finally, our analysis has focused exclusively on crash prediction, the first and most established research question in this domain. Equally important questions remain about the propagation mechanism through which leverage shocks transmit across cryptocurrencies, the effectiveness of specific intervention policies such as circuit breakers and position limits in the crypto context, and the optimal design of regulatory monitoring frameworks. These extensions, building on the empirical foundation established in this paper, represent the next frontier of research on leverage and systemic risk in cryptocurrency markets.

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