
Understanding Collaboration Stagnation in Developing-Country State-Owned Enterprise: A Study Using an Asymmetric Power Mapping Instrument

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Abstract

This article examines the case of Nizam Zachman Oceanic Fishing Port (NZOFP) to improve our understanding of how power asymmetry evolves and undermines collaboration in a publicly state-owned enterprise (Public SOE) setting jointly governed by two institutionally distinct entities. By applying Molinengo's (2022) Flows of Power framework, ten key micro-components of interaction order were analyzed to identify the causes of collaboration stagnation and ineffective operations. Findings reveal a persistent disconnect between designed interaction order (formal agreements, MoUs, delegation schemes) and emergent interaction order (unilateral adaptation, role substitution, informal governance). This study introduces a governance redesign through a Public Service Agency (PSA) transformation. PSA is not proposed as a normative ideal, but is analytically identified as the most suitable institutional form given NZOFP's current governance conditions. Under the PSA model, the port remains under state ownership while gaining greater operational and financial flexibility to manage services and coordination among stakeholders. This arrangement enables a more balanced distribution of authority, improves integration across policy and service agendas, and allows limited funding autonomy without undermining public accountability.

Keywords: collaborative governance, flows of power, port management, SOE–state hybrid, PSA reform

1. Introduction

Fishing ports act as national fisheries economic engines through landing, logistics, post-harvest processing, and non-tax revenue generation. Nizam Zachman Oceanic Fishing Port (NZOFP) serves as Indonesia's largest fisheries hub and a strategic eco-fishing prototype. Yet, although NZOFP is mandated to perform nine business functions, only three operate consistently, reflecting structural governance failure. Literature on Indonesian ports explains institutional fragmentation, but almost none operationalizes micro-level collaboration dynamics—how actors interact, negotiate power, reconfigure control, or replace one another when cooperation collapses. This study fills that gap by applying Molinengo's Flows of Power to map where

collaboration breaks, how power shifts shape emergent governance and why institutional redesign is necessary.

Currently, NZOFP is managed by two entities: PT Perikanan Indonesia (Perindo), a state-owned enterprise responsible for managing business activities in the fisheries sector and holding rights to the port's land, and the NZOFP, a vertical unit of KKP that owns the facilities and provides public services. Collaboration between these two entities is vital, as PT Perindo provides physical space and develops infrastructure, while NZOFP manages facilities to support fishery activities. This synergy is key to the port's operational effectiveness, productivity, and competitiveness in the national fishery sector, paving the way toward sustainable development.

Despite the existence of a formal collaborative design, the implementation of business functions at NZOFP continues to face persistent operational challenges, including limited budget capacity, inadequate human resources, and overlapping institutional authority that frequently triggers conflict—particularly between NZOFP and PT Perindo. As a result, only three of nine business functions are executed by NZOFP, while PT Perindo manages only two, leaving four functions inactive and ungoverned. Weak cross-sectoral integration further widens this execution gap, especially where infrastructure development does not align with the port's master plan, contributing to environmental degradation such as increasing tidal flooding driven by land subsidence.

The most critical manifestation of this structural misalignment is the continued stalemate in finalizing the Cooperation Agreement between NZOFP and PT Perindo—a deadlock that has persisted since 2015 and remained unresolved despite renewed negotiation attempts in 2023. Without a signed agreement, the collaboration lacks a functional interaction architecture, resulting in fragmented decision-making, minimal investment realization, and service disruptions—including a severe clean water deficit nearing 600,000 m³/year, which directly hinders fishing and port operational activities.

Taken together, these conditions reinforce the central argument of this study: that without an integrated governance framework capable of redistributing authority, financial control, and operational responsibility, collaboration at NZOFP cannot progress beyond symbolic cooperation. Thus, the research question is refined: How do dynamic and asymmetric power ecosystem (as represented by designed and emergent interaction orders) contribute to collaboration stagnation in the NZOFP SOE?

2. Theoretical Review

The Flows of Power theory developed by Molinengo (2022) conceptualizes collaboration not as a stable institutional arrangement, but as a dynamic power ecosystem in which actors continuously construct, contest, and renegotiate control. Collaboration evolves through the tension between two structural layers: the designed interaction order, which defines how collaboration should operate, and the emergent interaction order, which reflects how collaboration actually operates when confronted with resource constraints, shifting incentives,

and asymmetrical authority. This duality is not merely descriptive—it functions as a diagnostic lens for tracing why collaborative governance succeeds, stagnates, or collapses.

Within this analytical frame, the ten micro-components of the designed order—time, agenda, actors, forms of interaction, settings, facilitation materials, funding, expertise, documentation, and outcomes—serve as power-mapping instruments. Rather than simply listing institutional arrangements, the components allow the researcher to identify breakdown points, trace the direction of power circulation, and evaluate whether collaboration produces shared decision-making or unilateral substitution. A deficiency in even one micro-component can trigger cascading dysfunction across others, meaning the model is causal, not merely classificatory.

Molinengo’s emphasis on emergent interaction orders is particularly critical for understanding NZOFP. When designed components do not function, actors adapt—sometimes cooperatively, but often asymmetrically. In NZOFP, formal structures exist on paper, yet power does not flow through them: decision-making is concentrated, funding is rigid, and asset control is fragmented. These conditions do not simply result in incomplete business functions—they generate a new emergent governance reality, where NZOFP absorbs responsibilities abandoned by PT Perindo, and informal operational systems arise to substitute formal mechanisms. The failure of the designed order therefore does not end collaboration, but reshapes it into a survival-based power configuration.

This explains why the deadlock between NZOFP and PT Perindo is not merely administrative, but structural and power-bound. Their misaligned priorities (public service vs commercial revenue), overlapping asset mandates, and unclear division of technical responsibilities in key domains such as wastewater management, clean water provision, asset maintenance, and port sanitation illustrate how breakdowns in the ten micro-components materialize empirically. Instead of resulting in mutual adjustment, power imbalances produce compensatory behavior—NZOFP substitutes Perindo’s obligations, while Perindo retains asset authority without development capacity. According to Molinengo’s logic, this pattern signifies interaction order collapse, where the collaborative design remains intact normatively, yet in practice fails to generate co-production.

Thus, Molinengo’s framework enables the research to move beyond descriptive institutional mapping toward an explanatory mechanism of why cooperation stalls, how power concentrates, and where redesign must occur. Through this theory, collaboration is no longer evaluated by the existence of MoUs or committees, but by whether power can circulate across micro-components to produce joint action. In NZOFP, it cannot—and that empirical conclusion forms the theoretical basis for the institutional redesign proposals presented in subsequent chapters.

Table 1. Evaluation of Micro-Component Performance in NZOFP Hybrid Governance

Micro-Component	Operational Indicator	NZOFP Empirical Evidence
Time	meeting rhythm, agenda continuity	Regular coordination meetings create the appearance of collaboration, yet the absence of follow-through renders them procedurally active but substantively stagnant.
Actors	authority, mandate scope, skill asymmetry	NZOFP holds strong regulatory authority, while Perindo's weak business capacity creates an operational imbalance that undermines co-production rather than supporting it.
Agenda	shared goals, agenda integration	The dual mandate—public service for NZOFP versus commercial profit for Perindo—produces mission conflict that prevents agenda convergence and blocks collaborative alignment.
Interaction	decision mode: consultative/dominant	Routine “coffee morning” sessions operate as symbolic rituals rather than deliberative arenas, generating presence without decision and dialogue without governance.
Funding	budget autonomy & reinvestment	Rigid APBN funding on the NZOFP side and financial deficit on the Perindo side create a dual-budget paralysis, resulting in stalled business functions and the collapse of development momentum.
Materials	data, facilitation docs, TOR quality	Facilitation documents exist but remain non-technical and lack an execution roadmap, reducing them to administrative formality rather than actionable guidance.
Documentation	MoM & PKS utilization	Documentation exists but remains purely administrative and non-evaluative, offering record-keeping without generating learning, correction, or governance direction.
Setting	governance arena	The absence of a shared authority node shifts collaboration into institutional

		competition rather than synergy, turning partners into parallel actors instead of co-governors.
Expertise	technical vs commercial competence	Expertise misalignment triggers role substitution, forcing NZOFP to absorb functions that should be jointly delivered rather than collaboratively shared.
Output	business functions delivered	Only three of nine business functions are realized, serving as tangible evidence of collaborative collapse rather than partial progress.

The situation at NZOFP illustrates that collaboration which is not comprehensively designed and adjusted to on-the-ground realities can lead to stagnation or even failure in public service delivery. Therefore, Molinengo’s theory provides both a methodological and conceptual alternative for dissecting such deadlocks, precisely mapping the problems, and formulating more adaptive and contextual collaborative governance strategies. This theory is considered highly relevant as an analytical framework for research on business function governance at NZOFP because it can explain the complexity of collaboration and offer concrete, micro-level interaction design-based solutions.

A comparative analysis between PSA and alternative governance models is conducted to evaluate their capacity in responding to NZOFP’s complex institutional and service-oriented challenges. Given NZOFP’s dual function as a public service provider and an economically productive fisheries port, the governance arrangement must balance revenue flexibility, state-anchored control, and inclusive access for diverse stakeholder groups (Pollitt & Talbot, 2004; Verhoest et al., 2012).

The analysis demonstrates that PSA represents the most theoretically coherent response to NZOFP’s problem structure, as it facilitates coordinated circulation of authority across fiscal, administrative, and service dimensions while maintaining public accountability (Verhoest et al., 2012). In contrast, PPP and Port Authority models rely on structural and institutional assumptions—such as market-driven tariff regimes or extensive bureaucratic reengineering—that are not yet reflected in NZOFP’s existing governance framework (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; World Bank, 2017). Meanwhile, an SOE-exclusive model prioritizes commercial efficiency at the expense of social and public-service mandates, rendering it incompatible with fisheries welfare objectives (OECD, 2015). Consequently, PSA emerges as the most adaptive and context-sensitive governance model for NZOFP.

3. Research Method

This study adopts a post-positivist approach, which is based on the view that reality can be objectively understood but is still influenced by social and cultural contexts. This paradigm enables the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of the complexity of business function governance at NZOFP through the lens of Molinengo's (2022) collaborative governance theory, which emphasizes the dynamics of micro-interactions within collaborative relationships.

From an ontological perspective, this study acknowledges the diversity of stakeholder perceptions in interpreting business functions. Its epistemology seeks to obtain an objective understanding of inter-actor collaboration by interpreting the existing context. Meanwhile, from an axiological standpoint, this research aims to foster synergy among actors in the provision of port public services.

This study employs a qualitative research design with a descriptive approach. It is categorized as basic research and uses a cross-sectional design, with the research period running from January 2024 to May 2025. Data collection techniques include in-depth interviews with 10 key informants from the government, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), academia, consultants, and port users, as well as document analysis, which covers regulations, financial reports, cooperation agreements, and meeting minutes. The informants consisting of 3 representatives from JNZOFP, 1 from the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF), 3 from PT Perindo, 2 port users, and 1 external consultant, with interview durations ranging from 45 to 150 minutes, selected through purposive sampling and reinforced by expert validation. Data analysis is conducted using J. Creswell's model with the assistance of Nvivo 12 software, encompassing data reduction, coding, data presentation through graphs and word clouds, conclusion drawing, and triangulation.

The coding process was conducted in three stages. In the first-cycle coding, interview transcripts were subjected to open coding to extract emerging concepts grounded directly in participant narratives. This process generated raw analytical categories such as conflict, asset disputes, and financing constraints, which later served as the initial basis for thematic interpretation. In the second-cycle stage, axial coding was used to link patterns and group findings into two broader structural classifications—designed interaction order versus emergent interaction order—to reveal how collaborative functions shifted from formal intent to adaptive practice. The process concluded with theoretical coding, in which the refined themes were aligned with Molinengo's (2022) ten micro-components of power-flow collaboration, enabling a structured interrogation of deadlocks, asymmetries, and governance breakdown mechanisms within the NZOFP–Perindo relationship.

This research applies a reflective analytical stance, emphasizing contextual interpretation of interview statements rather than simple frequency counts, allowing deeper insight into the layered dynamics of collaboration. Through this approach, the analysis systematically traces key obstacles—such as the prolonged deadlock in the PKS process, contested land-use authority, and

ineffective coordination mechanisms—while generating evidence-based recommendations that are both analytically sound and practically implementable.

4. Research Results and Discussion

The findings are interpreted using Molinengo's (2022) Flows of Power framework, which distinguishes between (1) the designed interaction order—the formally constructed structure of collaboration—and (2) the emergent interaction order—the informal or adaptive structures that arise when collaboration does not function as intended. This chapter identifies how power flows, where it becomes blocked, how actors adapt, and why collaboration stalls.

4.1 Designed Interaction Order: A formally designed system that fails to function in practice.

At the outset, collaboration between NZOFP and PT Perindo was formally designed through MoUs, cooperation drafts, and the delineation of business functions. However, three key arenas demonstrate that the designed order did not translate into shared control or joint execution.

Analysis of the designed interaction order reveals that collaboration between NZOFP and PT Perindo is structurally conceived but functionally divergent. In the agenda arena, NZOFP is oriented toward public service and regulatory responsibilities, while PT Perindo prioritizes commercial revenue generation. The absence of a unified mission prevents agenda convergence, resulting in a partnership that runs in parallel rather than co-directed. Misalignment becomes more pronounced in the funding arena, where NZOFP's regulatory authority is not accompanied by fiscal autonomy, and PT Perindo's land-use control is weakened by limited investment capacity. This dual deficit generates a resource vacuum—initiatives exist on paper but lack the financial instruments required for implementation, creating a structural disconnection between mandate and capability.

The weakness of the designed order becomes evident in the interaction setting arena, where coordination forums do occur but remain ceremonial, producing discussion without execution. Meetings are held with regularity but without decision enforcement or follow-up, indicating that interaction functions procedurally rather than governantly. Taken together, these three arenas illustrate that collaboration is formally present yet analytically hollow: power is distributed in design but does not circulate in practice, causing stagnation in decision-making, halted operational progress, and an inability to actualize development agendas.

Table 2. Design–Reality Gap in NZOFP–Perindo Collaboration

Micro-Component	Designed Structure (Intended Order)	Empirical Findings (Observed Reality)	Resulting Imbalance (Analytical Outcome)
Agenda	The collaboration was designed under a unified joint port management vision.	However, no shared agenda has existed since 2015, indicating loss of strategic alignment.	Conflicting priorities emerge, preventing coordinated decision-making.
Funding	A combined investment scheme was expected to support joint business development.	APBN funding rigidity and Perindo’s financial deficit hinder capital mobilization.	No capital flow materializes, leaving development structurally stagnant.
Actors	JNZOFP and Perindo were positioned as equal partners with shared authority.	In practice, JNZOFP dominates regulatorily while Perindo lacks business capacity.	Actor imbalance produces power asymmetry and weak co-production.
Documentation	MoU and PKS drafts were prepared to institutionalize collaboration.	Documents remain administrative, non-evaluative, and PKS remains unsigned.	No policy uptake occurs, and legal instruments do not convert into action.
Outputs	Nine business functions were planned for joint implementation.	Only three business functions operate consistently across the port.	Functional stagnation demonstrates collapse of output realization.

Although the institutional architecture is formally established, the collaboration deteriorates because the design remains inert—unable to circulate authority, distribute resources, or trigger joint action. The absence of collapse in structure is therefore misleading; what fails is not the framework, but its translation into lived governance practice, where power is expected to flow but instead remains static.

4.2 Emergent Interaction Order: Substitution and Informal Governance

When the designed interaction order fails to translate into shared execution, collaboration at JNZOFP does not terminate but mutates into an emergent structure dominated by unilateral adaptation rather than co-production. The most evident form of this shift is power reallocation through necessity, in which JNZOFP progressively assumes operational responsibilities that were originally delegated to PT Perindo—including sanitation services, complaint handling, mooring operations, and parts of environmental management. Instead of functioning as a partner, JNZOFP becomes the compensatory actor, signaling not collaboration but adaptive unilateral substitution.

The failure of the designed system also stimulates the growth of informal economic actors, where small-scale processors, unregistered cold storage operators, and non-formal service providers emerge to fill operational vacuums left by the stagnation of formal business functions. Their presence reflects three systemic failures: the absence of coordinated regulation, market demand that exceeds institutional capacity, and the inability of the state–SOE partnership to deliver core services. These non-formal actors then evolve into a parallel economy that operates alongside—but detached from—formal governance authority.

At the same time, financial distress within Perindo pushes decision-making authority back toward JNZOFP, producing a form of bureaucratic recentralization. However, without fiscal autonomy, JNZOFP can only implement short-term damage control rather than structural reform. Thus, the collaboration enters a mechanistic causal sequence: regulatory ambiguity → authority conflict → investment paralysis → execution vacuum, culminating in an emergent order defined by unilateral substitution and informal sector expansion. The result is a dual-governance regime characterized by output stagnation and institutional fatigue.

Collaboration therefore does not collapse in form, but in function; it survives as an asymmetric governance arrangement, where one actor continuously compensates for the other, and where power flows no longer enable cooperation but sustain imbalance.

4.3 Causal Mechanism Explaining Collaboration Failure

The stagnation observed at NZOFP is rooted not in operational failure, but in a deeper structural and epistemic breakdown of governance. Collaboration begins with regulatory ambiguity, which evolves into a dual authority structure where assets lie under Perindo while regulatory power rests with NZOFP. This split mandate generates misaligned agendas, preventing both institutions from pursuing a unified strategic trajectory. The disconnect deepens as funding mechanisms fail to align, with NZOFP restricted by APBN regulations and Perindo unable to invest due to financial instability. As a result, the Cooperation Agreement remains stalled from 2015 to 2023, freezing institutional learning and decision flow. In response to this vacuum, JNZOFP is forced to substitute roles originally mandated to Perindo, not out of collaboration but necessity, leading to a distorted interaction order. Ultimately, this sequence culminates in functional stagnation, where only 3 of 9 business functions operate, demonstrating that the governance design exists structurally yet fails to circulate power, authority, and resources in practice.

4.4 Key Findings

The analysis shows that collaboration at JNZOFP fails not because institutional structures are absent, but because the designed order does not translate into functional practice—formal documents, MoUs, and coordination forums exist, yet are unable to generate shared control or produce joint decisions. In response to this non-functioning design, governance shifts into an emergent order driven by institutional survival rather than innovation, where JNZOFP absorbs operational responsibilities abandoned by Perindo, creating systemic imbalance and unilateral workload consolidation. These conditions reveal that incremental adjustments are insufficient;

instead, what is required is structural redesign. The proposed Public Service Agency (PSA) model emerges not as an administrative preference, but as a theoretically grounded solution capable of unlocking stalled collaboration by restructuring power flow, aligning agendas, enabling revenue reinvestment, and clarifying role authority. In other words, PSA is the only configuration that logically resolves the power blockages identified across Molinengo's ten micro-components, transforming static design into operable governance.

5. Policy And Theoretical Integration

The transformation of NZOFP into a PSA is not proposed merely as a strategic option, but as a logical theoretical outcome of the power-flow mapping conducted in this study. The recommendation arises from empirical evidence showing that the designed interaction order has failed to govern power distribution, resource mobilization, and agenda alignment between NZOFP and PT Perindo.

This chapter links findings to theoretical implications by demonstrating how PSA restructures the ten micro-components of collaboration, restores power symmetry, and facilitates organizational redesign.

5.1 PSA as Power-Redistribution Architecture

PSA introduces fiscal autonomy and place-based reinvestment, enabling revenue to circulate back into port development rather than being absorbed by the state treasury. The PSA model addresses the collaborative failures at JNZOFP by restructuring the core elements where the designed order breaks down. In the funding dimension, PSA introduces revenue retention and self-managed budgeting, allowing port income to circulate back into development rather than stagnate under APBN dependency or Perindo's financial shortfalls. PSA also corrects agenda fragmentation by merging public service obligations and commercial execution into a single institutional mandate, eliminating the parallel mission tracks that previously prevented coordinated planning. This realignment is reinforced through actor restructuring, where PSA clarifies institutional roles, dissolves dual authority, and reduces friction with Perindo by replacing compensatory governance with deliberate power allocation. As a result, business outputs no longer remain confined to maintenance-level survival, but gain the potential to expand into development-oriented performance supported by stable financing, unified direction, and coherent authority. In effect, PSA transforms collaboration from an asymmetric substitution regime into a structured joint capability system—shifting governance from symbolic design to operational reality. Under Molinengo's framework, PSA realigns four micro-components most responsible for the collaboration deadlock:

Table 3. Failure Points and PSA-Based Corrective Mechanisms

Failed Component	Corrective Role of the PSA Model
Funding	PSA enables revenue retention and self-managed budget flow
Agenda	PSA consolidates public service + business execution under one mandate
Actors	Role clarity eliminates dual authority and reduces conflict with Perindo
Outputs	Business functions scale beyond maintenance → development phase possible

5.2 Theoretical Implication

This research extends Molinengo’s theory by showing that power asymmetry can persist despite the presence of formally designed interaction structures, indicating that design alone does not guarantee equitable influence among stakeholders. When collaboration fails, it generates an emergent order that, while functional, reinforces inequities, highlighting the limits of relying solely on cooperative arrangements. Consequently, institutional redesign is necessary—not merely to improve collaboration, but to restore responsiveness in the flow of power across organizational and operational dimensions. The PSA model emerges as a viable mechanism for such redesign, effectively aligning micro-level components with broader institutional capabilities. Overall, the evolution from designed structures to emergent patterns, and then to deliberate redesign, illustrates a three-phase developmental trajectory in hybrid port governance, offering both theoretical and practical insights for enhancing systemic responsiveness and equity.

5.3 A Proposed Re-design Framework for NZOFP

A critical pathway for improving hybrid port governance involves realigning actor mandates to clarify functional boundaries: NZOFP should focus on public service delivery and infrastructure quality assurance, while PT Perindo concentrates on partnership-based commercial operations, avoiding entanglement in core governance decisions. Complementing this, the introduction of a revenue retention mechanism—a central feature of the PSA model—ensures that 70–80% of port income is systematically reinvested in key infrastructure, including waste management systems, mooring expansion, cold storage and logistics facilities, and digital monitoring and licensing tools, thereby reinforcing operational capacity without reliance on external funding. To operationalize this alignment, a Joint Governance Cell or PSA Command Unit is established as a single operational node integrating regulatory oversight, business implementation, performance evaluation, and multi-stakeholder feedback, reducing fragmentation and enhancing coordinated decision-making. Finally, the governance framework explicitly safeguards social inclusion by maintaining fee structures accessible to small-scale fishers, preventing market exclusion and ensuring that infrastructure and service improvements do not disproportionately benefit larger commercial actors.

5.4 Rationale for Advancing to a PSA Framework in Port Governance Evolution

From a power-flow perspective, the current governance structure cannot simply be fixed; a transformation via the PSA model is required. PSA uniquely realigns authority, financial

reinvestment, and operational coordination, directly addressing persistent power asymmetries. By doing so, it structurally enables collaboration that is both functional and equitable, ensuring that institutional objectives and stakeholder needs are effectively integrated.

Table 5. Findings-Driven Requirements and PSA Intervention Pathways

Requirement Identified in Findings	PSA Approach
Power stagnation under dual authority	Merges decision flow under one institutional body
No reinvestment capacity	Enables self-financed development cycle
Role substitution problem	Balances authority → reduces operational burden on NZOFP
Informal actor proliferation	Formalizes micro-economies through integrated monitoring

5. Conclusion

This study demonstrates that collaborative governance at the NZOFP does not fail due to the absence of institutional design, but because the designed interaction order is unable to circulate power, resources, and decision authority across actors. Through Molinengo’s Flows of Power framework, the analysis shows that collaboration stagnates when formal structures exist only symbolically without operational integration.

The key empirical finding is that power symmetry never materializes in execution. NZOFP holds regulatory authority and administrative responsibility but lacks financial autonomy—while PT Perindo controls land assets yet lacks the capacity to fund port development. This dual structure produces a long-term institutional deadlock where collaboration becomes substitutional rather than co-productive. Only 3 of 9 business functions operate consistently, confirming that the emergent order reflects survival-based adaptive action, not innovation or partnership synergy.

The study concludes that collaboration in hybrid state–SOE governance must not be viewed as a static institutional arrangement, but as a dynamic power flow ecosystem. When the designed order cannot move resources, actors improvise, redistribute roles informally, and unconsciously reshape the governance landscape. In NZOFP, this shift manifests in unilateral operational absorption by NZOFP and expansion of informal port micro-economies—revealing that collaboration continues, but in a distorted and inequitable form.

To restore power circulation and avoid further stagnation, institutional redesign is needed. The proposed transformation into a PSA emerges not as a normative policy preference, but as a logical consequence of empirical mechanism tracing. PSA corrects the four most critical blockages identified in this study: funding rigidity, agenda misalignment, unclear role authority, and absence of unified output responsibility. Unlike PPP or Port Authority models, PSA aligns

better with the socio-economic character of NZOFP—where vulnerable fishing communities, public service principles, and national food security remain core mandates.

Practically, PSA enables revenue reinvestment for infrastructure and service upgrades, eliminates excessive public-unit burdens, curbs informal-sector leakage, restores accountability, and ensures multi-stakeholder access, particularly for small-scale fishers, making the model not only feasible but structurally necessary. Limitations include single-case specificity, unmodeled financial scenarios, and incomplete capture of stakeholder behavioral responses, suggesting future research through multi-port comparisons, revenue simulations, and agent-based modeling to generalize the power-flow redesign framework across strategic ports and hybrid infrastructure sectors.

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