
The effect of board culture diversity on ESG disclosure: Evidence from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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Abstract

This study examines the influence of board culture diversity on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure within the context of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Drawing on a sample of 762 observations spanning from 2016 to 2021, a content analysis approach was employed to collect ESG disclosure scores. The results suggest a positive impact of board culture diversity on ESG disclosure. To reinforce the validity of these findings, robustness tests, including a lag model and an alternative proxy model, were conducted. Moreover, potential endogeneity concerns were addressed using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis, strengthening the study's reliability. This research contributes to the literature on the interplay between corporate board diversity and ESG reporting practices, especially within the specific context of the KSA-listed companies.

Keywords: Board culture diversity; ESG disclosure; Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

1. Introduction

In the era of interconnected global markets, Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosures have rapidly gained significance. Stakeholders around the world increasingly seek disclosure in these domains to assess a company's commitment to sustainability and ethical conduct (Albitar et al., 2020; Alsayegh et al., 2020; Daugaard & Ding, 2022). Companies are thus pressed to balance profitability with responsibility (Cornell and Shapiro, 2021). ESG disclosures, serving as evidence of a company's sustainable and ethical practices, are now essential for investors, regulators, and the general public (Carroll and Shabana, 2010).

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is actively participating in this global movement. Driven by its Vision 2030 initiative—an ambitious plan for economic diversification and sustainable development—KSA underscores the necessity for corporate transparency and alignment with global ESG standards (Qasem et al., 2022).

Corporate boards are pivotal in steering organizational direction and strategy. In this context, diversity within boards, which encompasses gender, age, expertise, and cultural background, is increasingly recognized as a pivotal driver for organizational advancement (Cumming & Leung, 2021). Empirical studies suggest that diverse boards often outperform their peers in various metrics, including innovation, resilience to market fluctuations, and financial performance. Such

diversity has also been linked with superior ESG performance and disclosure quality (Cucari et al., 2018; Lavin & Montecinos-Pearce, 2021; Shakil et al., 2020).

While the advantages of board diversity are evident (A. A. Zaid et al., 2020; Alhosani & Nobanee, 2023; Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013; Velte, 2016), one dimension especially relevant in KSA's context is board culture diversity, Which has not garnered significant scholarly focus despite its importance. This study centers on cultural diversity in relation to the national background of the board members. Cultural diversity is quantified based on the ratio of non-Arab members to the total number of board members. This metric is adopted due to the cultural congruence between Arab board members and the prevailing culture in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In this context, the inclusion of non-Arab individuals on boards is viewed as a more accurate indicator of cultural diversity, reflecting a range of perspectives that might differ significantly from the dominant cultural norms within the region.

Despite the importance of understanding how global influences, brought in by non-Arab board members, might shape ESG disclosure in KSA companies, there's a notable absence of comprehensive studies addressing this interplay. This research bridges this gap by examining the influence of board culture diversity on ESG disclosure, using a dataset of 762 firm-year observations from 127 non-financial firms listed in the Saudi exchange market (Tadawul) spanning 2016–2021. The main findings suggest a positive impact of board culture diversity on ESG disclosure. These findings are further reinforced by the robustness analyses, underscoring the importance of diverse cultural perspectives in enhancing ESG disclosure.

This study presents empirical insights into the determinants of ESG disclosure in KSA-listed companies, filling a significant gap in the prevailing literature and employing a unique ESG disclosure index according to the ESG Disclosure Metrics Guide provided by the GCC Financial Markets Committee. This study contributes to the existing literature on corporate governance, diversity, and ESG disclosure in the KSA context. The findings provide valuable insights for policymakers, corporate boards, and stakeholders interested in promoting diversity and ESG reporting.

The paper is organized in the following manner: Section 2 provides a review of existing literature. Section 3 outlines the theoretical perspectives and the development of hypotheses. Section 4 describes the research design. Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6 shows the robustness and endogeneity tests. Finally, Section 7 offers the conclusions of the paper.

2. Literature review

National culture refers to a collection of values and beliefs passed down from generation to generation. These cultural factors profoundly impact an individual's behavior, perceive their surroundings, and ultimately make decisions(Guiso et al., 2006; North, 1990). The influence of national culture on individuals' attitudes and actions highlights the significance of considering cultural dimensions when examining decision-making processes in various contexts. However, the impact of board culture diversity on ESG disclosure has received limited attention. This presents a critical research gap that needs to be addressed to understand the influence of board culture diversity on ESG disclosure in KSA-listed companies.

Previous research by Harjoto et al. (2019) underscores the potential benefits of diversity within a group for enhancing performance. Such diversity brings an array of knowledge, viewpoints, priorities, skills, and competencies, which can augment the group's problem-solving capabilities. Specifically, in the realm of corporate social activities, the inclusion of foreign directors on the board can add unique cultural insights and attitudes about the role of companies in society (Farooque et al., 2022; Sison, 2009). Ararat et al. (2015) also argue that including directors from diverse national backgrounds can enhance board performance. Their international expertise and insights into CSR challenges can contribute to elevating the quality of corporate CSR. Using a sample of 57 firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange that produced exclusive ESG reports from 2010 to 2017, Khan et al., (2019) reveal that national diversity is a valuable resource for firms, positively influencing the quality of CSR disclosure.

On the other hand, Watson et al., (1993) posited that culturally diverse groups, especially when newly constituted, might encounter difficulties in their interaction dynamics and problem-solving functions relative to groups with a homogeneous cultural background. This implies potential intricacies linked to board cultural diversity that may influence ESG disclosure. Furthermore, Katmon et al. (2019) examined the quality of CSR disclosure in 200 listed firms in Malaysia from 2009 to 2013. The study found a significant negative association between board nationality diversity and the quality of CSR disclosure.

Overall, the existing literature presents mixed findings regarding the impact of national diversity on ESG disclosure. While some studies suggest a positive association between board national diversity and ESG disclosure, others indicate potential challenges and negative associations. Therefore, further research is needed, particularly in the context of KSA-listed companies, to fill the research gap and provide a comprehensive understanding of the impact of board culture diversity -related to the national backgrounds of the board members- on ESG disclosure.

3. Theoretical perspective and hypothesis development

From the theoretical perspective, this study relies on Stakeholder, Institutional, Agency, and Upper echelon theories in explaining the mechanisms through which board culture diversity may impact ESG disclosure.

Stakeholder Theory suggests that board culture diversity plays a crucial role in ESG disclosure by incorporating the interests and concerns of various stakeholders in KSA companies. Diverse boards are argued to be more responsive to the needs and expectations of stakeholders, leading to increased ESG disclosure.

Institutional Theory highlights the role of external pressures and institutional norms in shaping ESG disclosure practices. Board culture diversity can be seen as a response to institutional pressures to adopt socially responsible practices, leading to increased ESG disclosure. However, the Theory recognizes that institutional environments can vary, and the effectiveness of board diversity in driving ESG disclosure may depend on the specific institutional context.

The Upper echelon theory posits that the characteristics and experiences of top executives, including board members, shape organizational outcomes (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In the

context of board culture diversity and ESG disclosure, this Theory implies that the cultural backgrounds and values of board members can influence the organization's commitment to environmental and social issues. Board members with diverse cultural backgrounds may bring different values and beliefs to decision-making, leading to a greater emphasis on ESG disclosure.

In contrast, Harjoto et al. (2019) pointed out that theoretical frameworks offer contradicted predictions regarding the impact of board diversity on the board's effectiveness in monitoring managerial responses to stakeholder concerns in alignment with the firm's core values and strategic goals. On one side, diversity may enhance creative problem-solving, a notion supported by intergroup contact theory and the cognitive resource diversity perspective. However, social categorization theory and the similarity/attraction paradigm suggest that diversity could impair team cohesion, thereby affecting collective decision-making processes. Such negative implications may be impaired by increased international representation on boards, which could hinder effective communication among board members, as noted by (Eulerich et al., 2014).

Based on this reasoning, the study proposes the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis: Board Culture Diversity positively impacts ESG disclosure in KSA companies.

4. Research Design

4.1 Sample and data

This study utilized a sample of 127 non-financial firms listed on the Saudi Exchange Market (Tadawul) over six years from 2016 to 2021, amounting to 762 firm-year observations. The financial data used in the study was collected from Thomson Reuters, and governance data was obtained from annual reports. The ESG disclosure scores were based on a content analysis approach. The sample distribution by industry can be found in Table (1).

Table 1. Industry distribution of the sample

Name of the Industry	Number	Percentage
Basic Materials	41	32.3%
Consumer Non-Cyclicals	20	15.7%
Real Estate	9	7.1%
Industrials	15	11.8%
Consumer Cyclicals	19	15%
Technology	5	3.9%
Energy	6	4.7%
Healthcare	9	7.1%
Utilities	2	1.6%
Academic & Educational Services	1	0.8%
Total	127	100%

4.2 Model and variables

Suitable models were created to analyze the hypotheses, including all dependent, independent, and control variables. The final regression models are as follows:

$$ESGD_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 BCDIV + \beta_2 COVID + \beta_3 LEV + \beta_4 CASH + \beta_5 CAP + \beta_6 AGE + \beta_7 BIG4 + \beta_8 BSIZ + \beta_9 BMET + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

Where:

- ESGD (ESG disclosure) = ESG disclosure score from the content analysis
- BCDIV (Board Culture Diversity) = Non-Arab board members to board size at the end of the year
- COVID (Covid-19) = The dummy variable equals 1 if the year after 2019, otherwise 0
- LEV (Leverage) = Total liabilities divided by total assets
- CASH (cash holding) = Cash to total assets
- CAP (capital expenditure) = Capital expenditure divided by total assets
- AGE (firm age) = Natural log of the firm age from the foundation date
- BIG4 (big 4 audit firm) = Dummy variable takes 1 if the audit firm is one of the big 4; otherwise, 0
- BSIZ (Board size) = The number of board members
- BMET (Board meeting) = The number of the board meeting

4.3 variable measurement

4.3.1 Dependent variable

The collection of ESG disclosure data in this study relied on the content analysis method. Specifically, ESG reports and annual reports. Using the ESG disclosure metrics guide provided by the GCC Financial Markets Committee 2023, which contains indicators covering the dimensions of ESG (environment, social, and governance), consistent with GRI standards and the United Nations sustainability principles.

The present study proposes a method for circulating an ESG disclosure index. This index comprises 29 leading indicators categorized into three pillars: environmental, social, and governance, as outlined in Table (2).

Table 2. The indicators of the ESG disclosure index

Environmental	Social	Governance
1- GHG Emissions	10- CEO Pay Ratio	20- Board Diversity
2- Emissions Intensity	11- Gender Pay Ratio	21- Board Independence members
3- Energy Usage	12- Employee Turnover	22- The company prohibits the CEO from serving as board chair
4- Energy Intensity	13- Gender Diversity percentage	23- Sustainability Incentivized Pay
5- Energy Mix	14- Temporary Worker Ratio	24- Supplier Code of Conduct
6- Water Usage	15- Non-Discrimination	25- Ethics & Prevention of Corruption
7- Environmental Operations	16- Injury Rate	26- Data Privacy policy
8- Environmental Oversight	17- Global Health & Safety	27- Sustainability Reporting
9- Climate Mitigation Risk	18- Child and Forced Labor	28- Disclosure Practices
	19- Human Rights	29- External Assurance

Each leading indicator is assigned a score of 1 if the company discloses the relevant information and 0 if otherwise. In order to get the ESG disclosure score for the firm, every firm's points are divided by the total number of pillar indicators and multiplied by 100. The composite ESG disclosure score is calculated as the mean of the individual scores from the ESG pillars.

4.3.2 Independent variable

Board culture diversity: the ratio of non-Arab board members to board size at the end of the year. This proxy is a crucial indicator for assessing the extent of cultural heterogeneity within corporate governance structures.

4.3.3 Control variables

In order to investigate the impact of board culture diversity on ESG disclosure, several control variables are included, which are COVID-19, Leverage, Cash holding, Capital expenditure, Firm age, Auditing firm, Board size, and The number of board meetings (Arayssi & Jizi, 2023; Nekhili et al., 2017; Wasiuzzaman & Wan Mohammad, 2020). This study also conceded the industry and year effects.

5. Empirical results

5.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for each variable in the study. The ESGD variable shows an average score of 20.3% with a standard deviation of 0.179, suggesting that KSA companies typically have a moderate engagement in ESGD. However, there's considerable variation across different entities. Board Culture Diversity (BCDIV) has an average of 2.8%, with values ranging from 0 to 44.4%, highlighting a significant diversity in board cultures among the sampled firms. The Leverage (LEV) metric average is 0.42 with a standard deviation of 0.227, while cash holding stands at an average of 0.043, ranging from 0.024 to 0.075. Capital expenditure (CAP)

has an average value of 0.041, peaking at 0.619. The BIG4 reveals that 45.4% of the company-year observations were audited by one of the Big 4 auditing firms. Additionally, the board size (BSIZ) averages 8.18 with a standard deviation of 0.498, and the board meeting (BMET) metric shows a mean of 5.38, spanning from 3 to 13 meetings. Notably, most variables in the model exhibit a low standard deviation, indicating their consistent and stable nature throughout the study.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
ESGD	762	20.3%	0.179	5.2%	93.6%
BCDIV	762	2.8%	7.9%	0	44.4%
COVID	762	0.333	0.471	0	1
LEV	762	0.422	0.227	0.042	0.848
CASH	762	0.043	0.021	0.024	0.075
CAP	762	0.041	0.052	0	0.619
AGE	762	3.241	0.577	1.099	4.22
BIG4	762	0.454	0.498	0	1
BSIZ	762	8.181	1.479	5	11
BMET	762	5.386	1.716	3	13

ESGD = environmental, social, and governance score; BCDIV (board culture diversity) = Non-Arab board members to board size at the end of the year; COVID (Covid-19) = Dummy variable equal 1 if year after 2019, otherwise 0; Lev (leverage) = measured as Total liabilities divided by total assets; CASH (Cash holding) = measured as Cash to total assets; CAP (Capital Expenditure) = Capital Expenditure divided by total assets; BIG4 (Audit firm)= measured as a dummy variable takes 1 if Audit firm from the big 4 otherwise 0; BSIZ (Board size) = measured by the number of board members, BMET (Board meeting) = measured by the number of the board meeting.

5.2 Pairwise correlation analysis

Table 4 highlights that every variable in the model boasts correlation coefficients under 0.4. These low coefficients signify a reduced risk of multicollinearity, ensuring that predictors in the model aren't overly interlinked. Low multicollinearity is crucial for maintaining the accuracy and interpretability of a statistical model, bolstering its reliability. In essence, the findings indicate a trustworthy model that can effectively discern individual variable impacts.

Additionally, the analysis reveals a significant positive correlation between board culture diversity (BCDIV) and ESGD, indicating that organizations with higher levels of cultural diversity among their board members are more likely to prioritize and engage in ESGD. Furthermore, the variables leverage (LEV), cash holdings (CASH), capital expenditure (CAP), (BIG4), and board size (BSIZ) all demonstrate positive correlations with ESGD.

Table 4. Pairwise correlation analysis

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
(1) ESGD	1.000									
(2) BCDIV	0.389*** (0.000)	1.000								
(3) COVID	0.095*** (0.009)	0.016 (0.656)	1.000							
(4) LEV	0.191*** (0.000)	0.194*** (0.000)	0.076** (0.036)	1.000						
(5) CASH	0.072* (0.047)	0.072** (0.047)	0.082** (0.023)	-0.124*** (0.001)	1.000					
(6) CAP	0.074** (0.040)	0.033 (0.367)	-0.161*** (0.000)	0.109*** (0.003)	0.061* (0.091)	1.000				
(7) AGE	-0.036 (0.323)	-0.178*** (0.000)	0.112*** (0.002)	-0.065* (0.075)	0.045 (0.216)	-0.096*** (0.008)	1.000			
(8) BIG4	0.280*** (0.000)	0.204*** (0.000)	0.021 (0.572)	0.119*** (0.001)	0.082** (0.024)	0.126*** (0.001)	-0.138*** (0.000)	1.000		
(9) BSIZ	0.224*** (0.000)	0.162*** (0.000)	-0.019 (0.604)	0.031 (0.391)	0.064* (0.080)	-0.004 (0.917)	0.031 (0.392)	0.272*** (0.000)	1.000	
(10) BMET	0.051 (0.157)	-0.003 (0.932)	0.062* (0.089)	0.031 (0.389)	-0.068* (0.061)	-0.001 (0.980)	0.006 (0.864)	0.093*** (0.010)	0.102*** (0.005)	1.000

ESGD = environmental, social, and governance score; BCDIV (board culture diversity) = Non-Arab board members to board size at the end of the year; COVID (Covid-19) = Dummy variable equal 1 if year after 2019, otherwise 0; Lev (leverage) = measured as Total liabilities divided by total assets; CASH (Cash holding) = measured as Cash to total assets; CAP (Capital Expenditure) = Capital Expenditure divided by total assets; BIG4 (Audit firm)= measured as a dummy variable takes 1 if Audit firm from the big 4 otherwise 0; BSIZ (Board size) = measured by the number of board members, BMET (Board meeting) = measured by the number of the board meeting.

5.3 Regression results

Table 5, columns (1) and (2) show the baseline results of the regression analysis of the impact of BCDIV on ESGD. Industry and year effects are considered in all the models. Table 5, Column (1) shows the results without including control variables. There is a significant positive impact of BCDIV on ESGD (0.744, $p < 0.01$). Consistently, when control variables are included in the model in Table 5, Column (2), a positive impact of BCDIV on ESGD persists (0.587, $p < 0.01$). These results support the study hypothesis, which indicates that board culture diversity is associated with higher ESGD.

Table 5. The baseline regression results.

Variables	(1) ESGD	(2) ESGD
BCDIV	0.744***(9.59)	0.587***(7.47)
COVID		0.053***(2.73)
LEV		0.095***(3.62)
CASH		0.676**(2.44)
CAP		0.194*(1.71)
AGE		0.009(0.85)
BIG4		0.051***(4.17)
BSIZ		0.017***(4.25)
BMET		0.002(0.57)
Industry effect	Yes	Yes
Year effect	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.043(0.66)	-0.225***(-2.79)
Observations	762	762
Adjusted R-squared	0.225	0.293

ESGD = environmental, social, and governance score; BCDIV (board culture diversity) = Non-Arab board members to board size at the end of the year; COVID (Covid-19) = Dummy variable equal 1 if year after 2019, otherwise 0; Lev (leverage) = measured as Total liabilities divided by total assets; CASH (Cash holding) = measured as Cash to total assets; CAP (Capital Expenditure) = Capital Expenditure divided by total assets; BIG4 (Audit firm)= measured as a dummy variable takes 1 if Audit firm from the big 4 otherwise 0; BSIZ (Board size) = measured by the number of board members, BMET (Board meeting) = measured by the number of the board meeting.

6. The robustness and endogeneity tests

6.1 Lag period model

The study model is adjusted using lagged values for both the independent and control variables, considering a delayed impact of BCDIV on ESGD. Column (1) of Table 6 displays the regression analysis results for the lagged BCDIV and control variables model. The findings demonstrate that the impact of lagged BCDIV on ESGD remains statistically significant (0.623, $p < 0.01$), further reinforcing and bolstering the robustness of the previous findings reported in Table 5.

6.2 Alternative proxy for BCDIV

An alternative proxy was utilized in this study to assess the robustness of the findings considering potential variations in measurement. Specifically, the dummy variables BCDIV_DUM were employed. BCDIV_DUM takes a value of 1 if there is at least one non-Arab board member; otherwise, 0.

Table 6 Column (2) reveals consistent outcomes compared to the baseline regression results presented in Table 5. Notably, a positive and statistically significant impact of BCDIV_DUM on ESGD is observed (0.146, $p < 0.01$), indicating a strong and meaningful relation.

Table 6. The results of the robustness analysis

Variables	(1) Lag Model	(2) Alternative proxy of BCDIV
BCDIV	0.623***(6.88)	0.146***(8.11)
LEV	0.119***(3.94)	0.081***(3.06)
CASH	0.826***(2.60)	0.667**(2.43)
CAP	0.128(1.03)	0.190*(1.69)
AGE	0.011(0.93)	0.009(0.89)
BIG4	0.051***(3.70)	0.051***(4.23)
BSIZ	0.017***(3.87)	0.016***(4.18)
BMET	0.001(0.027)	0.001(0.33)
Constant	-0.244***(-2.65)	-0.211***(-2.64)
Industry and year effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	635	635
Adjusted R-squared	0.293	0.302

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ ESGD = environmental, social, and governance score; BCDIV = board culture diversity; COVID= Covid-19 pandemic; Lev =leverage; CASH= Cash holding; CAP= Capital Expenditure; BIG4=Audit firm; BSIZ= Board size; BMET=Board meeting.

6.3 IV-2sls regression

In order to mitigate endogeneity concerns, this study employs the Instrumental Variable Two-Stage Least Squares (IV-2SLS) approach to re-estimate the baseline model. Following (Wang et al., 2021), this study uses the lagged value of independent variable (BCDIV) as an instrumental variable. Table 7 presents the results of the IV-2SLS analysis in Columns (1) and (2).

Column (1) of Table 7 displays the estimates from the first-stage regressions. The results indicate that the instrument L. BCDIV meets the validity requirement, as the coefficient is positive and statistically significant (0.952, $p < 0.01$) in explaining the exogenous variable (BCDIV). Moving to Column (2), which presents the results of the second-stage regressions, the predicted variable BCDIV-hat remains positive and significant (0.655, $p < 0.01$)

Table 7. The results of IV-2sls analysis

Variables	(1) 1 st Stage ESGD	(2) 2 nd Stage ESGD
L.BCDIV	0.952***(57.59)	
BCDIV_hat		0.655***(6.88))
LEV		0.103***(3.48)
CASH		0.789**(2.55)
CAP		0.232*(1.74)
AGE		0.012 (1.00)
BIG4		0.056***(4.03)
BSIZ		0.017***(3.80)
BMET		0.002(0.60)
Constant		-0.206**(-2.24)
Industry and year effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	635	635
R-squared	0.85	0.317

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 ESGT = environmental, social, and governance score; BCDIV = board culture diversity; L. BCDIV= BCDIV lagged by one year; BGDIV-hat= predicted value of BGDIV from the 1st Stage; COVID= Covid-19 pandemic; Lev =leverage; CASH= Cash holding; CAP= Capital Expenditure; BIG4=Audit firm; BSIZ= Board size; BMET=Board meeting.

7. Conclusion

This study investigates the association between board culture diversity and Environmental, Social, and Governance Disclosure in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) non-financial listed companies. The results indicate a significant positive relationship between board culture diversity and ESG disclosure, suggesting that increased board culture diversity potentially enhances ESG disclosure. These results are bolstered by robust analysis methods, including the lagged values model, alternative proxy for board culture diversity, and the IV/2SLS method to address the endogeneity concerns.

This research has profound implications for policymakers and regulatory bodies in Saudi Arabia and the wider Gulf Cooperation Council region. It suggests that policies promoting board diversity augment sustainability and social responsibility initiatives. For investors and stakeholders, the link between board diversity and ESG disclosure quality provides essential criteria for responsible investment decisions.

A key contribution of this study is the application of the 2023 ESG Disclosure Metrics Guide by the GCC Financial Markets Committee, providing a region-specific analysis of ESG practices in the Gulf region, including Saudi Arabia. This approach addresses a gap in the existing literature on corporate governance, diversity, and ESG in Saudi Arabia, offering valuable insights for policymakers, corporate boards, and stakeholders.

Nevertheless, While this study concentrates on board culture diversity in terms of national backgrounds, it recognizes the potential oversight of other important factors. Elements such as gender, professional, and educational diversity are also crucial in shaping board culture. Future research should include these aspects along with corporate governance frameworks, ownership structures, CEO attributes, and sector-specific variables to enrich the understanding of ESG disclosure determinants in Saudi Arabia.

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