Dynamics of the Middle Class in the Democratic Republic of Congo

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Abstract

The main objective of this study is to analyze the dynamics of the middle class in the DRC. It is based on a pseudo-panel corrected for statistical pitfalls from two waves of surveys on employment, the informal sector and household consumption, organized by the DRC's National Institute of Statistics in 2005 and 2012. From the analyzes carried out, it emerges that households identified as being part of the middle class were placed in the category known as the 'lower middle class'. In its evolution, the middle class has not undergone any significant expansion. Overall, this dynamic loses 2 percentage points and this is significantly observed in rural areas. In addition, a contrasting trend emerged at the level of the provinces. Only 11 provinces out of 26 have experienced significant growth in the middle class in 7 years. On the other hand, the dynamics of the middle class is not positive in 9 provinces, both in the lower middle class and in the upper middle class. The profiling carried out allows us to conclude that household characteristics such as the education of the head of household, the size of the household, its occupation status on the labor market and its socio-professional status have contributed to the dynamics of the middle class in the DRC.

Keywords: Middle class, Household profiling, Growth and welfare.

1. Introduction

Today there is a consensus around the role of the middle class in the development process (Chun et al, 2011; Birdsall, 2010; Banerjee and Duflo, 2007; Hummels and Klenow, 2002; Easterly, 2001; Schor, 1999; Murphy et al, 1989). Its importance is justified in the field as social policy (Loayza, et al, 2012), it contributes to the reduction of inequalities and polarization of income (Borraz et al, 2011), improvement of social capital and institutions (Josten, 2005; Loayza, et al., 2012; Jacquemot, 2012c), it increases merchants' consumption (Cantu and Villarreal, 2008) and allows for personal success (Jacquemot, 2012a; Escusa, 2012; Toulabor, 2012; Soiron-Fallut, 2012; Nallet, 2012; Barreau-Tran, 2012; Morillas, 2012).In developing countries, the emergence of the middle class is now clearly seen as a remedy to the development impasse (Asongu, 2015; Shimeles and Ncube 2015; Kodila et al, 2014; Kodila and Mbala, 2015).

According to the United Nations Development Programme, between 1990 and 2010, the share of the middle class in developing countries increased from 26% to 58% and its massive expansion

and reconfiguration suggests that by 2030, more 80% of the global middle class is expected to reside in developing countries and account for 70% of total consumer spending (UNDP, 2013). Moreover, with regard to African countries, with aundeniably sustained economic growth on average around 5 and 6% of the Gross Domestic Product between 2000-2010 (Pinkovskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2014), it has contributed positively to poverty reduction (Young, 2012; Pinkovskiy & Sala-i-Martin, -i-Martin, 2014). Jacquemot (2012a) noted on this subject that a 10% increase in average income resulted in a decrease of 8 to 20% in the proportion of people living below the poverty line depending on the country.

Also, these two decades of growth have resulted in the emergence of the middle class (Jacquemot, 2012b; Juma 2011; AfDB, 2011). The size of this social stratum increased to 34% in 2010 or 350 million people against 27% or 126 million in 1980. Is this emergence of the African middle class also a reality in the DRC? The legitimacy of this question is due to the fact that since 2002, the DRC has also experienced considerable economic growth to the point that IMF estimates placed the DRC's economic growth at 10.4% in 2015. It therefore follows that all other things being equal, that this growth should punctuate the dynamics of the middle class. Also, to our knowledge, the question of the contribution of economic growth to the emergence of the middle class in the DRC is still very little debated, while there is a logical interest in looking into this question, especially when we consider concerns the period 2005-2012, a period during which a strong dynamic of growth would have been observed.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the second section, the theoretical framework for analyzing the notion of the middle class is presented, while relying on the different approaches used in the literature to understand the middle class. The third section focuses on data and methodology. In the fourth section, the results of the analyzes are presented and the fifth last section concludes the article.

2. Middle class: the theoretical framework

The identification of the middle class is based on two approaches, it is the monetary approach on the one hand, and the non-monetary approach on the other hand. The monetary approach is based on two sub-approaches: relative and absolute. The first identifies the middle class as that which lies in the middle of the income distribution. Birdsall et al. (2000) define the middle class by an income of between 75% and 125% around the median income. For its part, Easterly (2001) informs that the middle class is made up of the population included in the three middle quintiles, excluding the quintile of the richest and the poorest. The African Development Bank (2011) defines it in relative terms by individuals or households that fall between the 20th and 80th percentile in the consumption distribution.

On the other hand, according to the absolute monetary approach, the middle class is defined by an annual individual income higher than 3,900 USD in purchasing power parity or with a daily expenditure per person between 2 and 4 USD and between 6 and 10 USD per person. day (AfDB, 2011). On this subject, Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) propose to define this class as all the households whose per capita income is between the average per capita incomes of Brazil and Italy, i.e. between 10 and 20 dollars per day. in PPP 2005. In a study of 13 developing countries,

Banerjee and Duflo (2008), suggest that members of the middle class are people whose daily consumption is between 2 and 10 USD per day. This middle class is divided into two groups by the authors: those who consume 2 to 4 USD per day and 6 to 10 USD per day and also emphasize the importance of adding other secondary criteria to the income criterion, in particular behavior, attitudes, consumption preferences, style of life, etc For his part, Ravallion (2009) proposes an interval that takes into account the poverty line in developing countries and the poverty line in the developed world, in particular according to United States standards.

According to this author, the middle class is any population with an income that falls within the range of 2 to 13 USD per day. But also, given that Uruguay is the developing country with the high poverty line of $9 per day; he also focused on what he calls the "developing world's upper middle class" as a category of people with an income between $9 and $13. Chun et al. (2011), on the other hand, used both the absolute and relative definition of the middle class in 72 developing countries.

The middle class as a population with an income between 2 to 10 USD per day, absolute definition; and the one with a share of household income between 70% and 120% around the median income, relative definition. Kharas (2010), for his part, Internationally, the World Bank and the OECD have proposed a "Global Middle Class" or the global middle class. It designates the new "middle classes" in emerging countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China). People with an income between the per capita income of Brazil and Italy, 4,000 and 17,000 USD per year or an international range of 12 to 50 USD per day per person in purchasing power parity. The weakness of this approach is that there is no consensus on the choice of intervals. Moreover, the transformation thus carried out makes it possible to use the 4 monetary approaches thus adopted (Table 1).

Table 1. Approaches to measuring the middle class

Authors	Classification criteria
African Development Bank (2011)	Poor
	Floating class 2 to 4 USD/pers/day
	Middle class 4 to 20 USD/pesr/day
	Rich > 20 USD/pers/day
Banerjee and Duflo (2008);	lower class
	Middle class 2 to 10 USD/pers/day
	Higher class
Ravallion (2009)	lower class
	Middle class 2 to 13 USD/pers/day
	Higher class
World Bank	lower class
	World Middle Class 12 to 50 USD/pers/day
	Higher class

Source: Authors

The non-monetary or multidimensional approach is one that does not give preponderant importance to monetary aspects. It consists, in addition to the criterion of earned income, in identifying the social classes according to the self-assessment of the people studied (subjective criterion) and according to the type of profession exercised (sociological criterion). The subjective criterion is defended by authors such as Bigot (2008) and Damon (2012). The sociological criterion places the middle class as the intermediary between the most modest categories (workers and employees) and the most affluent (executives and business leaders). Moreover, in line with the multidimensional approach of the middle class, Nayab (2011) is one of the reference studies.

Indeed, his study proposes an approach which consists in giving the indices for each variable considered according to the literature as essential to belong to the middle class. While this method has the advantage of more or less avoiding arbitrariness in estimating the middle class compared to methods using income as the sole criterion or the subjective aspect, it does not, however, justify its relevance the weight assigned to each variable likely to explain the social position of an individual or his household, in particular education, type of housing, occupation of the head of household and lifestyle.

3. Data of analysis

The data used in this study come from two waves of surveys on employment, the informal sector and household consumption carried out (1-2-3) in the DRC in 2005 and 2012. Indeed, this survey comprises three nested phases, the first of which aimed to collect information on employment and working conditions. In addition to employment, it also focused on unemployment and the working and living conditions of the population. Phase II focused on informal production units (IPU) and the last (Phase III) on household consumption. As part of this work, data mainly from phase 3 are used. The sample covers 12,087 households in 2005 and 21,403 households in 2012.

However, while the sampling practices and methods used for data collection in the 1-2-3 surveys took into account standard norms both in the preparation of the questionnaires and in the actual collection of the data; Moreover, several statistical pitfalls emerged in the use of these data. These pitfalls mainly concerned sampling frames, non-standardized prices of food products and nutrient intakes; imputation of rents; and finally contextual diversity in time and space. To correct all these methodological problems thus raised, the study by Marivoet et al (2018) constituted a reference in the matter and made it possible to make available to researchers, a new database on phase 3 of the 1-2-3 survey and corrected statistical pitfalls. It is indeed a pseudo-panel constructed from information from two waves of surveys (2005 and 2012). In 2005 the survey covered 11 provinces, that of 2012 cuts the national territory into 26 strata, corresponding to the 26 provinces.

To allow comparability over time between the two survey waves, the construction of the pseudo-panel by the authors (Marivoet et al) also required the use of interpolation techniques in order to emerge from the information on the different strata. constituted in 2005, a link with the logic of strata in 2012. Whereas in 2005 the survey covered 11 provinces, that of 2012 cuts the national

territory into 26 strata, corresponding to the 26 provinces. To allow comparability over time between the two survey waves, the construction of the pseudo-panel by the authors (Marivoet et al) also required the use of interpolation techniques in order to emerge from the information on the different strata. constituted in 2005, a link with the logic of strata in 2012.in 2005 the survey covered 11 provinces, that of 2012 cuts the national territory into 26 strata, corresponding to the 26 provinces. To allow comparability over time between the two survey waves, the construction of the pseudo-panel by the authors (Marivoet et al) also required the use of interpolation techniques in order to emerge from the information on the different strata. constituted in 2005, a link with the logic of strata in 2012.[1]This study therefore relied on these data to implement the analyses.

Thus, relying on household expenditure as an indicator of income, the monetary approach is adopted in order to identify the dynamics of the middle class. This is indeed consumption expenditure in Power Parity (Milanovic and Yitzhaki, 2002). To approach the thresholds as proposed by supporters of the monetary approach, the consumption expenditure variable in PPP was converted into US dollars at the rate of 506 Congolese Francs FC for 1 dollar (2012 as reference year) in order to facilitate comparisons[2].

4. Results

• Description of average household consumption expenditure
In fact, it appears that between 2005 and 2012, average daily household expenditure fell by $0.01 (ie $4.32 against $4.31). While the minimum level of household expenditure drops by $0.103 (from $0.575 to $0.472), a fairly significant change is observed among households with the highest levels of daily consumption expenditure. While in 2005, these households allocated $61,576, an average amount estimated at $50,524 was observed in 2012, which means that the expenditures of these households fell by $11. Furthermore, it should be noted in both 2005 and 2012 that household spending remained low and concentrated to the left of the distribution, and the situation seemed much more pronounced in 2012 (see figure 1)

Figure 1. Daily consumption per adult equivalent in USD PPP

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[1]For fairly detailed explanations of these data corrected for statistical pitfalls, see the pilot study by Marivoet et al (2018)

[2]GDP amounted to 13.678 billion current US$ in 2012 and 24.873 billion US$ PPP, while the exchange rate was 920 FC for 1 US$ (BCC, 2013). Assuming that the intervals to define the middle class have been specified in US$ PPP, it follows: (920/24.873*13.678), which leads to retain the amount of 506 FC/$.

Source: Based on 1-2-3 surveys (2005 and 2012).

• Distribution of average household consumption expenditure by province

Differences appear when we look at the situation of the provinces. If we can note that only 10 out of 26 provinces saw their level of average daily consumption expenditure increase (Kinshasa, Kwilu, Kwango, Mongala, Tshuapa, Haut Uele, Sankuru, Tshopo, Sud Kivu and Kasaï), it is in the province of Tshuapa that these expenses almost doubled, going from $3.28 to $6.36 (i.e. 93.9% variation) and 25% in the city of Kinshasa. While maximum expenditure increased between these two periods in these 10 provinces, it was in Kinshasa and Kasai that it fell by 4.74% and 27.91% respectively. The rest of the provinces are experiencing a drop in daily consumption expenditure and in this category, in the province of Kasaï Oriental, these expenditures fall by $1.71.

Table 2. Daily consumption expenditure in USD PPP by province

provinces	2005				2012			
	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Kinshasa	4.12	3.69	0.66	50.78	5.17	4.07	0.59	48.48
Kongo-Central	4.20	2.35	0.65	28.24	4.19	2.98	0.85	50.52
Maï-Ndombe	5.08	3.44	1.14	47.92	4.22	2.71	0.88	31.42
Kwilu	4.14	2.38	0.65	19.93	4.49	2.36	0.89	21.69
kwango	3.68	1.71	0.74	14.66	3.82	3.29	0.59	42.32
Equateur	5.22	2.36	0.58	13.08	4.48	2.92	0.70	30.28
Sud-Ubangi	4.98	2.54	1.12	16.21	3.58	2.28	0.62	27.42
Nord-Ubangi	4.94	4.32	0.59	41.82	4.60	2.52	0.73	18.03
Mongala	5.09	1.85	1.69	12.32	5.16	2.61	1.26	21.23
Tshuapa	3.28	1.38	0.66	9.71	6.36	3.52	1.29	32.99
Tshopo	4.45	2.45	0.71	18.36	5.14	2.61	0.74	22.03
Bas-Uele	4.49	1.64	1.58	10.89	3.82	2.08	0.70	20.13
Haut-Uele	3.84	1.67	1.08	10.01	4.27	2.19	0.76	17.37

Ituri	4.08	2.52	0.69	26.76	3.60	2.17	0.50	17.06
Nord-Kivu	4.73	3.58	0.66	61.58	4.41	2.93	0.70	42.18
Sud-Kivu	2.99	1.67	0.85	17.91	3.35	2.44	0.87	30.85
Maniema	4.61	2.26	0.73	18.53	4.02	1.96	0.97	14,520
Lualaba	4.67	2.42	0.84	16.71	4.02	2.40	0.63	19.23
Haut-Lomami	3.95	2.03	1.36	18.83	3.79	2.18	0.59	17.51
Tanganyika	4.06	1.82	0.98	19.16	3.45	2.32	0.47	21.88
Haut-Katanga	5.30	2.99	0.99	20.34	5.00	3.74	0.64	45.88
Kasaï-Oriental	5.11	3.06	0.80	18.85	3.40	1.78	0.70	19.44
Sankuru	2.45	1.46	0.58	10.05	3.05	2.08	0.62	14.72
Lomami	4.39	2.38	0.98	16.03	3.64	2.22	0.73	19.10
Kasaï	3.93	2.55	0.59	24.75	4.56	2.18	0.64	17.84
Kasaï-Central	4.26	2.82	1.05	42.19	3.65	2.54	0.68	30.87

Source: Based on 1-2-3 surveys (2005 & 2012).

This description reveals the existence of strong variability in the maximum level of household expenditure, which nevertheless attests to a contrast in the fact that despite such a significant drop observed for the 16 provinces, 9 of them experienced an increase in maximum expenditure (Kongo Central, Equateur, Sud Ubangi, Tshopo, Bas Uele, Tanganyka, Haut Katanga, Kasai Occidental and Lomami). Indeed, if these results give an idea of the trend in household consumption expenditure, they do not however allow us to highlight the proportion of households which, based on a certain number of characteristics, may or may not belong to the different situations described. The analyzes carried out subsequently make it possible to sufficiently deepen this description.

- **Middle Class Dynamics Results**

The analyzes are presented in three stages, first the dynamics of the middle class for the whole of the DRC on the one hand and according to the place of residence on the other hand, while taking up the results according to the four approaches adopted, This allows us to test the robustness of the results. Then, these results are supplemented by a more detailed analysis of the dynamics of the middle class at the level of each province. Thus, Table 4, based on the approach proposed by the ADB, gives for each year and each province, the proportion of households identified in the different categories. The five columns for the two periods (2005 and 2012) show respectively the class of the poor (P), the floating class (CF), the lower middle class (CMI), the upper middle class (CMS) as well as the upper class (CS).

From these analyses, it emerges that the households identified as being part of the middle class are essentially located in the so-called "lower middle class" category, which includes a large number of households, regardless of the approach used. This result confirms those already found by Kodila et al (2017) who attest that the dynamics of the middle class of developing countries and in particular those of Sub-Saharan Africa are concentrated between the floating class and the lower middle class. Based on this orientation, it follows that the middle class did not expand between 2005 and 2012. If in the DRC as a whole, this dynamic fell by 2 percentage points, we can however note that this is significantly observed in rural areas. Referring to the approach of Banerjee and Dufflo (2008) or that of Ravaillon (2011), we note that the middle class is not experiencing any progress: While its proportion drops by 2.10 points in the first case, it remains very significant in the second case (i.e. a decrease of 2.0 percentage points). The urban environment remains the sector which has seen a slight improvement in the middle class,

although this is at low and insignificant proportions.

It also appears that this dynamic is stifled in rural areas by the increase in the proportion of poor households (i.e. nearly 5% overall), this also justifies the drop of 5.67 percentage points observed in the proportion households considered to belong to the floating class in 2005. Indeed, the floating class which is considered as an intermediate class between the poor class and the lower middle class makes it possible to grasp the level of vulnerability of households and the change in the structure of households over time. This result, supporting those attested by the work of Shimeles and Ncube (2015) and those of López-Calvaand and Ortiz-Juarez (2011), show that between 2005 and 2012, economic growth led to more vulnerability of households in rural areas. rural.

Table 3. Dynamics of the middle class 2005-2012 (in %)

	African Development Bank				Banerjee and Duflo				Ravallion				World Bank			
	Whole															
Categorization	2005	2012	Diff	GIS	2005	2012	Diff	GIS	2005	2012	Diff	GIS	2005	2012	Diff	GIS
Poor	12.09	13.54	1.45	***	12.09	13.5	1.45	***	12.09	13.5	1.45	***	98.4	97.9	-0.58	ns
Floating class	42.83	43.41	0.58	ns												
Lower middle class	42.00	39.33	-2.67	***	84.83	82.7	-2.10	***	86.8	84.8	-2.0	***	1.55	2.14	0.59	ns
Upper middle class	2.90	3.33	0.43	**	3.08	3.72	0.64	ns	1.11	1.66	0.55	ns	0.03	0	-0.03	ns
Higher class	0.17	0.40	0.23	***												
	Geographical area															
	Urban															
Poor	11.30	10.85	-0.45	ns	11.3	10.9	-0.45	ns	11.3	10.9	-0.45	ns	97.5	96.9	-0.69	ns
Floating class	41.05	41.24	0.19	ns												
Lower middle class	42.99	42.72	-0.27	ns	84.04	84	-0.08	ns	86.99	86.7	-0.29	ns	2.41	3.14	0.73	ns
Upper middle class	4.32	4.49	0.17	ns	4.66	5.19	0.53	*	1.71	2.45	0.74	ns	0.06	0.01	-0.05	ns
Higher class	0.34	0.7	0.36	*												
	Rural environment															
Poor	12.76	15.83	3.07	***	12.76	15.8	3.07	***	12.76	15.8	3.07	***	99.2	98.7	-0.47	ns
Floating class	44.33	45.24	0.91	ns												
Lower middle class	41.17	36.45	-4.72	***	85.5	81.7	-3.81	***	86.64	83.2	-3.46	***	0.82	1.29	0.47	ns
Upper middle class	1.71	2.34	0.63	***	1.74	2.48	0.74	ns	0.6	0.99	0.39	ns				
Higher class	0.03	0.14	0.11	ns												

Source: Based on the 1-2-3 surveys (2005 & 2012), (*, **, ***): significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% threshold, diff: statistical difference.

Although these results are intuitive, they do not allow us to highlight the specificity of each province. If, in general, the growth of the middle class is not observed, a contrasting trend emerges at the level of the provinces. 12 provinces have seen the proportion of households deemed to belong to the middle class increase. However, if for certain provinces this increase can be observed in the two categories of the middle class (lower and upper), we can nevertheless note the low income for certain households in order to enable them to access the upper middle class. While the proportion of households in Kinshasa and Haut Katanga increases from 4.07 and 9.36 percentage points and 1.86 and 5.04

Table 4. Regional trends in the middle class (in %)

provinces	2005					2012				
	P	CF	CMI	CMS	CS	P	CF	CMI	CMS	CS
Kinshasa	11.87	8.61	5.98	8.88	35.00	6.28	8.26	10.05	18.24	30.00
Kongo-Central	7.75	8.81	8.16	3.85	10.00	4.04	5.32	4.37	4.33	5.00
May-Ndombe	0.71	2.63	3.70	5.03	5.00	3.08	3.18	2.93	3.14	1.25
Kwilu	5.05	5.66	4.13	3.85		2.20	4.52	5.59	2.39	3.75
kwango	3.27	4.43	2.68	0.30		5.21	3.03	2.38	1.20	6.25
Ecuador	1.49	1.38	3.74	3.85		3.74	3.81	4.22	5.23	3.75
South Ubangi	1.49	2.89	4.22	5.03		4.59	4.33	2.55	1.94	2.50
North Ubangi	2.35	2.21	2.27	5.03	15.00	2.75	3.15	4.42	4.63	
mongala	0.57	1.44	4.09	0.89		0.62	2.39	4.39	4.04	2.50
Tsupa	1.49	2.01	0.78			0.40	1.41	4.79	8.97	3.75
Tshopo	1.85	2.29	2.54	2.66		1.28	2.95	5.57	3.59	5.00
Lower Uele	0.43	1.08	1.66	0.59		2.86	3.37	2.58	1.49	1.25
Haut Uele	1.78	2.45	1.84	0.30		1.87	2.81	3.30	1.35	
Ituri	5.05	5.08	4.13	3.25	5.00	4.26	3.14	2.02	1.79	
North Kivu	6.61	8.47	9.78	13.31	15.00	4.95	5.81	6.05	4.19	8.75
South Kivu	17.20	7.70	3.21	1.18		6.79	4.25	1.85	1.94	3.75
Maniema	3.06	6.26	8.92	6.80		2.75	3.23	3.41	1.20	
Lualaba	2.77	3.55	4.73	5.03		3.52	4.12	3.13	3.14	
Upper Lomami	0.92	1.67	1.23	0.59		3.41	2.81	2.40	1.64	
Tanganyika	0.64	1.77	1.45	0.30		2.64	2.68	1.05	1.64	1.25
Upper Katanga	2.91	3.17	5.69	10.36	5.00	5.83	6.49	7.55	15.40	16.25
Kasai-Oriental	1.35	2.41	2.89	5.92		5.58	4.64	2.73	0.90	
sankuru	5.40	1.48	0.41	0.30		7.16	2.35	1.48	1.05	
lomami	4.98	3.79	4.67	5.03		5.28	4.35	2.79	2.39	
Kasai	7.04	5.08	3.89	5.62	5.00	2.86	3.27	5.51	2.54	
Kasai-Central	1.99	3.69	3.21	2.07	5.00	6.02	4.33	2.88	1.64	5.00

Source: Based on 1-2-3 surveys (2005 & 2012).

it appears that for the lower middle class, provinces such as Equateur, Tshopo, Bas Uele, Haut Uele, Lomami and Sankuru, only show an increase of 0.84 percentage points on average with a peak in the province of Equateur, an increase of 1.38 percentage points against 0.05 percentage point in the province of Lomami.

Moreover, a fairly significant evidence is observed in the province of Tshuapa where there is a proportion of 8.97% of households in the upper middle class in 2012 while it did not exist in 2005 and the share of households in the lower middle class rose from 0.79% to 4.78% (an increase of 4.01 percentage points). Indeed, intuitively, the province of Tshuapa experienced between 2005 and 2012 an increase in daily consumption expenditure, we note that the

maximum level of these increased by 23.28 US dollars in 2012 (from 9.71 US dollars to US$32.99). It seems obvious that such an increase in daily consumption expenditure significantly improves the transition from the poor class to the middle class because, there is also a drop of 1, 09 percentage points of the proportion of households identified as poor. The same observation is made for the province of Mongala where the increase in consumption expenditure of nearly 9 US dollars (from 12.32 dollars to 21.23 dollars between 2005 and 2012) led to an increase of 3.15 points percentage in the middle class.

On the other hand, the economic growth observed between 2005 and 2010 did not make it possible to regulate the dynamics of the middle class in 9 provinces (Maï Ndombe, Sud Ubangi, Ituri, Nord Kivu, Maniema, Lualaba, Kasaï Oriental, Kasaï and Kasaï Central) in both the lower-middle-class and upper-middle-class categories. It emerges, for example, that a deterioration of the situation in the provinces of Kivu and Maniema where the proportion of households belonging to the middle class has fallen by 3.78 and 9.12 percentage points and by 5.51 and 5 .6 percentage points respectively for the lower middle class and the upper middle class and just like the Province of Kasaï Oriental where we also observe a decrease of 5, 02 percentage points in the upper middle class while the lower middle class only drops by 0.16 points. The other 6 provinces are experiencing a decline of 1.35 and 1.90 percentage points on average, respectively in the lower middle class and the upper middle class.

• Profiling the middle class

The various results presented above, although intuitive, do not differentiate between households since they are limited to highlighting the trends and proportions of households in one or another category of socioeconomic well-being. The analysis through the profile allows for this purpose to identify the factors that have contributed to the explanation of the differences observed in the different proportions of households. Indeed, the profile of the middle class is understood here as a set of indicators which, for an individual or a household and based on a certain number of characteristics, provide information on the state of the middle class or the probability of being middle class among different categories of individuals or households. Defined as such, the profile of the middle class provides information and characteristics of households while illustrating the heterogeneity that characterizes them. However, this profile is presented according to the characteristics of the heads of household and the emphasis placed on the characteristics of the head of household comes from the fact that it is often this person who plays the most important role in the household in terms of work and employment,[3]

Thus, from the profile drawn up (Table 5), it appears that the proportion of male heads of household is declining in the dynamics (83.6% and 88.3% for the lower middle class and the

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[3]Admittedly, the head of household is considered the main provider of income and responsible for important decisions. But concentrating on him amounts to partially concealing the role of other members whose contribution can be just as significant to the standard of living of the household. In fact, in some households headed by elderly people or widows, the head plays his role on an honorary basis only. In these cases, major contributions and decisions about the household rest with the earners. Paying attention to the characteristics of the head of household, however, has the advantage of simplicity, and it makes it possible to give a much more approximate outline to the poverty profile (Kamala, 2013).

upper middle class in 2005 against 82.52% and 83.53% in 2012), and an increase by 1.08 and 4.77 percentage points respectively for the lower middle class and the upper middle class for female household heads. Households whose head age varies between 30-49 years are the most represented and their proportion gains 2.04 percentage points in the lower middle class category.

Poor households have a fairly high size of individuals and those whose size goes beyond 10 experience a decline of 0.54 and 0.88 percentage points respectively in the two classes. It therefore follows that households with fewer individuals (1-5 people) belong more to the lower middle class and the upper middle class, i.e. respectively 72.23% and 82.08% in 2012 against 71.2% and 81.06% in 2005 (an increase of 1.03 and 1.02% points). This finding can be justified by the demographic burden of the household, which in this case remains low compared to households with many individuals. The idea that education improves the social position of individuals can support our results (Kamala, 2013; Krueger and Lindhall, 2001; Schultz, 1997; Mincer, 1974; Becker, 1975). It appears that compared to households with no education or with a level of primary education, households whose head has a secondary level belong more to the middle class and their proportion increased by 4.28 percentage points between 2005 and 2012 and households with a higher level are more represented in the higher class. Household heads working in the public sector and in the formal private sector tend to belong to the middle class and the socio-professional status (executives, qualified and semi-qualified employees) also justifies the differences observed between households. While the self-employed and those in the informal sector, although numerous, their proportion does not seem to resist the dynamics of the middle class households whose head has a secondary level belong more to the middle class and their proportion increased by 4.28 percentage points between 2005 and 2012 and households with a higher level are more represented in the upper class. Household heads working in the public sector and in the formal private sector tend to belong to the middle class and the socio-professional status (executives, qualified and semi-qualified employees) also justifies the differences observed between households. While the self-employed and those in the informal sector, although numerous, their proportion does not seem to resist the dynamics of the middle class households whose head has a secondary level belong more to the middle class and their proportion increased by 4.28 percentage points between 2005 and 2012 and households with a higher level are more represented in the upper class. Household heads working in the public sector and in the formal private sector tend to belong to the middle class and the socio-professional status (executives, qualified and semi-qualified employees) also justifies the differences observed between households. While the self-employed and those in the informal sector, although numerous, their proportion does not seem to resist the dynamics of the middle class 28 percentage points between 2005 and 2012 and households with a higher level are more represented in the upper class. Household heads working in the public sector and in the formal private sector tend to belong to the middle class and the socio-professional status (executives, qualified and semi-qualified employees) also justifies the differences observed between households. While the self-employed and those in the informal sector, although numerous, their proportion does not seem to resist the dynamics of the middle class 28 percentage points between 2005 and 2012 and households with a higher level are more represented in the upper class. Household heads working in the public sector and in the formal private sector tend to belong to the middle class and the socio-professional status (executives, qualified and semi-qualified

employees) also justifies the differences observed between households. While the self-employed and those in the informal sector, although numerous, their proportion does not seem to resist the dynamics of the middle class skilled and semi-skilled employees) also justifies the differences observed between households. While the self-employed and those in the informal sector, although numerous, their proportion does not seem to resist the dynamics of the middle class skilled and semi-skilled employees) also justifies the differences observed between households. While the self-employed and those in the informal sector, although numerous, their proportion does not seem to resist the dynamics of the middle class

Table 5. Profile of the middle class

	2005					2012				
	P	CF	CMI	CMS	CS	P	CF	CMI	CMS	CS
Gender of head of household										
Male	81.81	82.52	83.61	89.64	80.00	81.39	81.07	82.62	83.86	91.25
Women	18.19	17.48	16.39	10.36	20.00	18.61	18.93	17.38	16.14	8.75
Age of head of household										
15-29	8.03	13.38	21.42	22.78	15.00	11.19	13.99	19.74	22.12	17.50
30-49	56.79	56.00	50.15	59.17	65.00	57.03	52.73	49.27	50.22	48.75
50-64	26.94	22.77	20.87	14.20	20.00	24.88	25.15	23.34	20.78	27.50
65 and over	8.24	7.85	7.55	3.85	0.00	6.90	8.13	7.65	6.88	6.25
household size										
1-5 individuals	28.78	45.04	71.33	82.54	80.00	36.15	52.22	72.52	83.26	86.25
6-10 individuals	56.72	48.35	26.52	15.09	15.00	54.50	43.79	25.87	15.25	12.50
10 and more	14.50	6.60	2.15	2.37	5.00	9.36	4.00	1.61	1.49	1.25
Educational level										
Uneducated	17.98	14.71	11.91	6.51	10.00	24.11	20.78	13.42	8.67	3.75
Primary	41.79	37.68	34.66	19.53	10.00	29.17	26.93	21.06	13.75	8.75
Secondary	37.31	42.46	45.14	49.41	25.00	39.34	44.05	49.47	43.20	35.00
Superior	2.91	5.16	8.29	24.56	55.00	7.38	8.23	16.05	34.38	52.50
Marital status										
Married	89.34	90.15	91.30	94.67	100.00	89.98	89.55	90.39	92.83	95.00
Not married	10.66	9.85	8.70	5.33	0.00	10.02	10.45	9.61	7.17	5.00
Occupational status										
Public sector	8.85	12.91	15.21	21.81	44.44	8.38	12.68	18.70	25.98	35.29
Formal private sector	1.77	2.07	2.94	4.36	0.00	1.26	1.92	2.24	3.20	8.82
Informal private sector	89.39	85.03	81.86	73.83	55.56	90.36	85.41	79.06	70.82	55.88
Socio-professional status										
Frame	2.59	3.95	6.49	15.82	40.91	1.78	3.84	7.3	14.84	36
Qualified employee	6.58	9.08	10.77	14.56	18.18	6.73	9.67	15.1	25.04	17.33

Semi-skilled employee	7.32	7.43	6.49	6.33	4.55	6.28	8.19	8.69	8.04	10.67
Self employed	83.5	79.55	76.24	63.29	36.36	85.2	78.3	68.91	52.09	36

Source: Based on 1-2-3 surveys (2005 & 2012).

4. Conclusion

By resuming the pace of economic growth since 2002, the DRC was able to record strong growth between 2005 and 2012. It follows that this economic growth should, all other things being equal, be accompanied by an improvement in the level of household life. Among the beneficial effects of this growth, this study focused on the dynamics of average growth. Based on data from two waves of surveys on employment, the informal sector and consumption in 2005 and 2012, the study made it possible to count on the winners and losers of economic growth in the DRC. Also, from the analyzes made, it appears that between 2005 and 2012, the average daily expenditure of households fell by 0.01 dollar (i.e. 4.32 $ against 4.

In its evolution, the middle class did not experience significant expansion between 2005 and 2012. If for the whole of the DRC, this dynamic loses 2 percentage points and this is significantly observed in rural areas. In addition, a contrasting trend emerges at the provincial level. We note that only 11 provinces out of 26 have experienced significant growth in the middle class in 7 years. On the other hand, the dynamics of the middle class are not positive in 9 provinces both in the category of the lower middle class and in the upper middle class. In addition, the profiling carried out makes it possible to conclude that the characteristics of the households such as the education of the head of the household, the size of the household,
Armed with this insight, two main lessons can be drawn with regard to policies in favor of the development of the middle class from the education and employment sectors: (1) there is a need to devote more resources to the quality of education and therefore to investment in human capital and (2) that of taking into account the aspects of decent work and the quality of employment of individuals.

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